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Trials are vanishing.  At the same time, individuals, corporations, 
and other institutions have become wealthier, more powerful, and more 
influential than ever before.  The stakes in litigation have reached 
unprecedented heights.  With the expansion of the global economy, 
disputes between parties involve significant pre-trial strategy and cost 
considerations on both domestic and international levels.  Complex cases 
are being increasingly resolved through settlement agreements based on 
massive discovery cost considerations and expected outcomes after pre-
trial motion practice. 
An unrealized consequence of the vanishing trial phenomenon is a 
corresponding lack of input from the federal appellate courts in some of 
the most important and cutting-edge cases.  In response to this trend, this 
Article argues for increasing litigants’ access to federal appellate courts 
through “manufactured finality.”  After exploring the historical origins, 
rationale, and cost considerations underlying the final judgment rule, the 
Article analyzes the concept of “manufactured finality,” or the ability to 
appeal partial adjudications by dismissing non adjudicated claims without 
prejudice.  The Article argues that a gradual shift toward acceptance of 
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manufactured finality is inevitable.  As a result, the United States Supreme 
Court should endorse criteria for appellate courts to consider when 
deciding whether to review a partial adjudication as a final judgment.  
Such an effort would balance and smooth the transition to greater 
appellate court access, and provide much needed definition and clarity to 
a more workable and modernized final judgment rule. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the world embraces new technology, globalization, and increased 
concentrations of wealth in the hands of elite groups of individuals, 
corporations, and other institutions, the nature of litigation is changing.1  
Cases are bigger, more complex, and involve stakes larger than ever 
before.2  At the same time, the explosively high costs of discovery and 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1st ed. 2014) 
(discussing the increased wealth of the world’s top 1, .1, and .01 percent of the population, 
and noting a return to a pre-World War I economic structure referred to as “patrimonial 
capitalism” where birth and inherited wealth will be a greater influence on an individual’s 
socio-economic status in comparison to talent or hard work); Anup Shah, Poverty Around 
the World: Inequality, Globalization, and a New Global Elite, (Nov. 12. 2001), 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/4/poverty-around-the-world (noting an increased 
concentration of wealth in a new global elite); Robert Hunter Wade, The Rising Inequality 
of World Income Distribution, 38 FIN. & DEV.: A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE OF THE IMF 4, 
(2001) available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/wade.htm 
(discussing the “champagne glass” structure of the global economy, where over 80% of the 
world’s wealth is in the hands of the richest 20% of the population). 
 2 Most recently technology, tort, and financial litigation have involved multi-billion 
dollar amounts.  For example, Apple recently recovered over $1B from Samsung in a patent 
dispute.  The cases are Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96302 
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 12012)  and Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS91450 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013), and selected case documents are available at 
http://cand.uscourts.gov/lhk/applevsamsung.  The case received widespread media 
attention.  See Jessica A. Vascalero, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case: Jury Finds Samsung 
Mobile Devices Infringed Six Apple Patents, Awards $1.05 Billion in Damages, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 25, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239639044435840457
7609810658082898.  A South Dakota lean fine textured beef producer also recently sued 
for more than $1B in damages based on defamation and disparagement.  See Beef Products 
Inc et al v. American Broadcasting Cos et al, Circuit Court of South Dakota, Union County, 
No. 12-292.  A discussion of the case is available at http://www.law360.com/articles
/541151/abc-diane-sawyer-can-t-escape-1-2b-pink-slime-suit.  JP Morgan’s $13B payout 
for mortgage lending practices also received widespread media attention. See Neil Irwin, 
Everything You Need to Know About JP Morgan’s $13 Billion Settlement, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/21/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-jpmorgans-13-billion-settlement/.  See also Kevin 
LaCroix, Substantiating the Explosive Growth in M&A Related Litigation, The D&O 
Diary, (Posted on January 17, 2012) available at http://www.dandodiary.com
/articles/securities-litigation/ (remarking that , “[r]eports corroborate the explosive growth 
in M&A-related litigation on deals worth $100M or more in recent years,” but also noting 
that much of this litigation is in state courts – traditionally Delaware); Kevin LaCroix, Are 
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litigation have led to a preference for settlement in order to resolve 
disputes in place of trials.3 
This raises the question: on what basis are these massive block-buster 
cases being settled?  Today, parties negotiate the terms of a settlement 
agreement in light of the success and failure of pre-trial motion practice, 
critical documents found in discovery, and calculations about the expected 
outcomes of a trial, even if one is never held.4  With the stakes so high, 
                                                                                                                                     
Securities Class Action Opt-Out Actions Back?, THE D&O DIARY, (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/articles/securities-litigation/ (noting the rise of opt-outs and 
the large settlements they obtain in securities class actions). 
 3 See Lawyers for Civil Justice et. al., Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, 
May 10-11, 2010, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Duke%20Materials/Library/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Compan
ies.pdf. (noting that in aggregate, companies spend billions of dollars on litigation spend 
due to ballooning discovery costs and fees.). 
 4 For a discussion of the settlement phenomenon see Christina L. Boyd & David A. 
Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming Oct. 2010), 
(Temple Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-8. available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649643 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1649643) (noting the 
attention scholars have paid to, “settlement’s propriety, timing, incidence, and 
causes . . . given that most filed civil cases settle.”); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most 
Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 
1339 (1994) (noting that “‘[m]ost cases settle’ has become commonplace in discussions of 
civil justice,” while acknowledging this observation requires some qualification due to 
statistics representing cases that do not go to trial that may also include cases disposed of 
by authoritative decisions in ways other than trial.) The growing ADR movement, 
mediation, arbitration, and non-traditional dispute resolution mechanisms also play a large 
role on the decreasing frequency of trials.  Robert J. Niemic, Mediation Becoming More 
Appealing in Federal and State Courts, 5 DISP. RESOL. 13 (Summer 1999) (noting that, 
“[i]n the trial courts, ADR diverts some disputes – expensive commercial transaction cases, 
for example – out of the court system that might otherwise generate difficult and complex 
appeals.  The ADR movement also took root at the appellate level.  Most appellate courts 
have established an in-court ADR track and more resources are being invested in settling 
appeals with the result of increasing the supply of appellate decisionmaking.”); Mori 
Irvine, Better Late Than Never: Settlement at the Federal Court of Appeals, 1 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 341, 342—350 (1999) (“95%] of all federal civil cases settle before trial.”) 
(describing the 1990 passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act and the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1998 solidifying a variety of ADR processes and settlement mechanisms 
the district courts might implement including mediation, arbitration, neutral case 
evaluation, summary jury trials, and other hybrids).  The article also outlines the 
development of ADR at the appellate level beginning with the 2nd circuit’s Civil Appeals 
Management Plan (CAMP) which has eventually led to, “nearly every United States court 
of appeals . . . establish[ing] a mediation program to assist parties in resolving their 
appeals . . . established under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 33.” Id.; see 
generally Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute 
(Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998) 
(acknowledging and discussing the use of form contracts to bind consumers to arbitrate 
claims arising out of purchases of wireless phones, home computers, and televisions 
despite concerns about disparate bargaining power). Regardless of the cause, trials are 
vanishing.  See Blake D. Morant, The Declining Prevalence of Trials As A Dispute 
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winning or losing a pre-trial motion can swing the settlement pendulum 
millions of dollars in one direction or the other.5 
The new cost structure and trends towards settlement have not 
escaped the attention of the judiciary, or the Supreme Court.6  Procedural 
rule changes from recent decisions have begun to fundamentally change 
the way federal court litigators practice.7  Perhaps the most noteworthy of 
these changes have been modifications to the pleading requirements and 
the ability of claims to survive a motion to dismiss.8  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court’s adoption of heightened fact pleading requirements in 
Iqbal and Twombly have gained widespread attention, and generated 
vigorous debate about whether the new standards will stifle 
underdeveloped, yet ultimately meritorious claims.9  Although speculation 
runs rampant about the exact reasoning behind the heightened pleading 
requirements, the changes are due, in part, to an effort to reduce the 
number of non-meritorious claims that survive motions to dismiss.10  
Recognizing that litigation can be just as much a resource war as it is a 
purely legal one, in the modern economy, a litigant’s ability to survive a 
motion to dismiss, can create immense pressure on opposing parties to 
                                                                                                                                     
Resolution Device: Implications of the Academy, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1123, 1124-
1130 (2012) (“The trend toward fewer trials is indispensable.  From the middle of the 
twentieth century until the present, the number of disputes that are finally decided in 
judicial proceedings has declined exponentially . . . [t]he diminished use of trials may also 
be attributed to the increased employment of less costly procedures grouped 
within . . . Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) . . . [and] the judiciary’s tendency to 
encourage settlement.”); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials 
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 
– 464 (“[t]he absolute number of trials has undergone a sharp decline . . . [t]he decline in 
the rate of civil trials in the post-World War II federal courts continues and accentuates a 
long historic trend away from trial as the mode of disposing of civil cases.”); Thomas E. 
Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 101, 107 (2006) (“According to recent studies, the classical trial is vanishing. 
There has been a long-term, gradual decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trials.  
There has been a pronounced, steep decline in the absolute number of trials in the past 
twenty years.”);  cf. Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State 
Courts Over The Last Half Century, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 133, 134 (2006) (“But this 
raises a question: Why the vanishing-trials phenomenon . . . that is, the sharp decline in the 
percentage of cases that are resolved by judgment after trial?”). 
 5 Pierre H. Bergeron & Bruce A. Khula, The Future of Discretionary Appellate 
Review, 31 APP. PRAC. 3 (2012) (“A single errant ruling swings the settlement pendulum 
millions of dollars in one direction or the other.”). 
 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (building upon the plausibility standard in 
Twombly); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (adopting a heightened 
plausibility pleading standard). 
 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 10 See infra note 11. 
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settle, purely because of the massive costs associated with commencing 
discovery.11  The Court recognized that in today’s world, when plaintiff’s 
win motions to dismiss , it is not too different from winning period.12 
At the same time, in many areas of the law, significant settlement 
activity is occurring without any input from the appellate judiciary.13  In 
the earliest stages of the federal judiciary, organizing appellate review 
required a Supreme Court Justice to go circuit riding, and travel long 
distances to sit with district court judges in order to create appellate 
                                                                                                                                     
 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559-60 (2007) ((“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy 
of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery 
process through “careful case management,” given the common lament that the success of 
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. . . . And it is 
self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of 
evidence at the summary judgment stage,” much less lucid instructions to juries; the threat 
of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases 
before reaching those proceedings.”) (citations omitted)). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Settlement has “become the dominant trend in civil litigation over the past several 
decades . . . [but as] fewer cases go to trial or even reach an identifiable final judgment - - 
- [t]he ultimate results of these rends is that fewer and fewer district court decisions are 
scrutinized by the appellate courts.  See Bergeron and Khula supra note 5.  For example, 
“[m]ass tort trial judges are creating systematizing, and refining the genre alone, without 
the guidance of appellate courts. [B]ecause mass tort litigation almost exclusively 
emphasizes pretrial maneuvering and settlement, appellate courts never review many of 
the most controversial rulings and innovations of mass tort trial judges. Id.  This is also 
happening in FCPA jurisprudence.  Commenting on United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 
(5th Cir. 2004), FCPA litigators noted that, “[a]lthough technically binding only in the 5th 
circuit, the Kay decision is likely to be persuasive precedent throughout the United States, 
particularly because so few FCPA matters result in appellate rulings. See Philip Urofsky 
&Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO 
BRIBES OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 
(Shearman & Sterling LLP, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 1, 2009, at 1, 10, available at 
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-030509-FCPA-Digest-Cases-And-Review-
Relating-to%20Bribes-to-Foreign-Officials-under-the-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act.pdf 
(discussing United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) cited in Daniel J. Grimm, 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisitions Transactions: Successor 
Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J. OF LAW & BUS. 247, 279 (2010). “[T]he SEC’s 
enforcement strategy . . . forces settlement and leaves little judicial accountability. There 
are very few precedents for dealing with the FCPA so there is little judicial guidance to 
follow.” See e.g. Jacquelyn Lumb, SEC Historical Society Panel Discusses Developments 
in FCPA, SEC TODAY (Wash. Servs. Bureau, Chi., Ill), Apr 21, 2010, at 1 (discussing 
comments by law professor Jeffrey Mann) cited in Grimm, at 279, n. 150. In FCPA 
jurisprudence,”[t]here aren’t that many cases that go to trial,” and “[t]he vast majority of 
cases have resulted in settlements.” David Glovin, Kozeny to Spend Investor’s Oil Bribery 
Trial at Bahamas Estate, BLOOMBERG, May 30, 2009 (quoting Danforth Newcomb of 
Shearman Sterling LLP on the FCPA trial of Frederic Bourke, calling it “a legal rarity,” as 
“‘[t]here aren’t that many cases that go to trial in the FCPA area.’”). 
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panels.14 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this meant that 
appellate court proceedings required a far greater expenditure of time and 
resources in comparison to district court pre-trial and trial proceedings.15  
In today’s world, the resource costs have flipped.16  Appellate panels are 
easily convened, federal appellate review has transformed into a low cost, 
largely electronic and online based phenomenon, and pre-trial discovery 
is the cornerstone cost consideration for party’s engaged in litigation.17 
As a result, changes to the pleading standards should mark the 
beginning and not the end of modifications to the procedural rules.  Future 
modifications should be based not only on growing discovery costs and 
the vanishing trial phenomenon, but also upon the decreased costs of 
appellate review in today’s world in comparison to the past.  One such 
needed yet overlooked modification to the procedural rules is increasing 
access to the appellate courts through relaxation and modernization of the 
final judgment rule.  Specifically this article that argues the Supreme Court 
should take advantage of the new low cost structure of appellate review by 
encouraging resolution of legal questions before factual ones in large and 
complex cases.18  The Supreme Court can accomplish this by permitting 
limited forms of manufactured finality.19 
In this context, manufactured finality refers to appealing an adverse 
partial adjudication after dismissing any non-adjudicated claims without 
prejudice.  For practitioners, relaxation of the final judgment rule may 
prevent hasty and unwise decisions about settlement based on significant, 
                                                                                                                                     
 14 See THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009). Professor Baker provides a detailed analysis of 
the major historical stages of the federal court system from the creation of the Supreme 
Court in Article III of the Constitution and the historic Judiciary Act of 1789 to all versions 
leading up to the modern structure of the federal judiciary.  Professor Baker outlines the 
fact that non-Supreme Court appeals originally required two Supreme Court justices to sit 
with a district judge as a panel. Later, Congress reconstituted the circuit courts to require 
that only one justice and one district judge sit on an appellate panel.  By 1891, the country 
had become too large for circuit riding to be feasible for the justices. 
 15 Id.; see also Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts: 
Relationships in the Future, in C. Harrison & R. Wheeler, eds., THE FED. APP. JUDICIARY 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Federal Judicial Center 1989)(writing generally about the need for 
more appellate court involvement in district court decisions involving appeal. In particular, 
Professor Carrington argues the late Dean Roscoe Pound would agree with increased 
appellate involvement before traditional final judgment due to the reversed resource 
requirements of trials and appeals where appeals now require significantly less resources 
than trial proceedings). 
 16 Id. 
 17 See Lawyers for Civil Justice et. Al, supra note 3 (acknowledging the ballooning 
costs of massive discovery and pre-trial expenditures). 
 18 See supra note 15. 
 19 See infra Parts III B & III C. 
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yet potentially errant rulings without appellate court consideration.20  For 
district court judges, permitting limited manufactured finality will 
significantly help control dockets, avoid the unnecessary expenditure of 
judicial resources, and lead to clearer rulings on complex issues due to 
added appellate court guidance.21  For appellate courts, increasing access 
will lead to higher quality, much needed, and greater numbers of higher 
court legal precedent, critical to the proper development of emerging areas 
of the law.22  For policy makers, a more uniform, clear, and balanced 
approach to finality will remove doctrinal inconsistency, and lead to better 
and fairer settlements.23 
Part I provides the background and history of the final judgment rule.  
Part II addresses a three-rule circuit split on the issue of manufactured 
finality, and analyzes the issue based on seven different criteria.  Part III 
A argues a relaxation and modernization of the final judgment rule and 
limited acceptance of manufactured finality is inevitable and already 
underway.  Part III B argues the fairness, efficiency, and piecemeal 
litigation advantages of limited manufactured finality outweigh appellate 
resource cost disadvantages.  Part III C argues Supreme Court action can 
harmonize the transition towards a modern and more relaxed view of the 
final judgment rule. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In its infant stages, the structure of the judiciary changed 
significantly from the initial creation of the U.S. federal court system in 
the late eighteenth century.24  As the need for appellate review became 
more widespread due to “geographical expansion, population growth, 
commercial development and expansions of jurisdiction,” Congress 
ultimately passed the 1891 Evarts Act,25 which created the framework for 
the appellate judiciary that is in place today.26 
Yet throughout that time, the final judgment rule has remained 
largely untouched.27  While there have been plenty of exceptions and 
moves over, under, and around the final judgment rule that have 
                                                                                                                                     
 20 See infra note 229 and corresponding text. 
 21 See infra note 237 and corresponding text. 
 22 See infra note 229 and corresponding text. 
 23 See infra note 229 and corresponding text. 
 24 See BAKER, supra note 14. 
 25 Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891); see THOMAS E. BAKER, 
A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS § 1.03 History of the 
Courts of Appeals, (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009). 
 26 Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 27 See infra notes 28–29, 31. 
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marginally increased appellate rights, the final judgment rule remains the 
“primary gatekeeper” to the doors of the appellate courts.28   With roots 
predating the founding of the country,29 recitations of the final judgment 
rule can be found in the 1789 Judiciary Act,30 in a form substantially 
similar to the rule’s modern-day codification in Section 1291 of the United 
States Code.31  Consistent with these firmly grounded historical roots, 
there have been few major changes to the application of the final judgment 
rule apart from the adoption of Rule 54(b) in 1939. 
Rule 54(b) states that federal district courts “may direct entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or 
parties . . . [w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief” and 
“[t]here is no just reason for delay.”32  The purpose of Rule 54(b) was to 
modernize appellate procedural rules and balance the deep-rooted interest 
against piecemeal litigation with the recognition that there are situations 
where allowing an appeal before resolution of an entire action is 
beneficial.33  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Rule 54(b) was 
                                                                                                                                     
 28 John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence 
With Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L. J. 200, 204 (1994). 
 29 Id. at 202 (citing 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3906, at 
264 (1992)) (“the final judgment rule can be traced to the write of error at English common 
law.”). 
 30 Id. at n. 13.  Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States; Chapter XX, 
§§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83 – 87: 
[Section 21:] [F]rom final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or 
value of three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed 
to the next circuit court . . . 
[Section 22] [F]inal decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court, 
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive 
of costs, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit 
court . . . upon a writ of error . . . .  And upon a like process, may final 
judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit 
court . . . where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand 
dollars, exclusive of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the 
Supreme Court . . . . 
[Section 25] [A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of 
law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had . . . may 
be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United 
Stats upon a write of error . . . . 
 31 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (“The circuit courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction 
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”). 
 32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 33 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956) (discussing the 
promulgation of Rule 54(b) and its amendments in order to “meet[] the current needs of 
judicial administration.”); see also Marianne Fogarty, The Finality of Partial Orders in 
Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 643-644 nn. 48-50 
(1989) (recognizing that courts have also approached the final judgment rule pragmatically 
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in large part a response to the increasing complexity and size of litigation, 
and was intended to implement a newfound recognition that the smallest 
“judicial unit” for appellate review was no longer an entire case, but often 
times, rulings within a case.34 
Despite the adoption of Rule 54(b) close to seventy-five years ago, 
academics, practitioners, and judges have questioned whether additional 
steps are necessary to change the civil practice rules yet again to adapt to 
the modern day realities of litigation.  Specifically, “[i]s it time to revisit 
the rigidity of the final order doctrine?”35  Others have simply commented, 
“[t]he final judgment rule is not working very well.”36  These calls to 
action should no longer be ignored.  The Supreme Court should modernize 
the final judgment rule and permit limited forms of manufactured finality.  
This long overdue change will properly align the federal judiciary with the 
new cost structure of litigation in today’s world, increase much needed 
access to the appellate courts, and lead to better-reasoned and more 
equitable settlements. 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Commentators, judges, academics, and policy makers have 
approached the issue of manufactured finality in different ways.  Some 
have emphasized whether the circuits have overlooked the importance of 
whether dismissals of non-adjudicated claims are with or without 
prejudice.37  Some have found the issue is best understood by focusing on 
                                                                                                                                     
and with considerations of “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”) 
(citing Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848)); Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962).  The author also notes that Forgay, “provided the first 
secure basis for interpreting the final judgment requirement flexibly in order to alleviate 
the hardship that may result if orders . . . cannot be reviewed until entry of the clearly final 
order.” Marianne Fogarty, The Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under 
Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 643-644 nn. 48-50 (1989) (citing 15 C. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3910, at 453). 
 34 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. at 432 (“[w]ith the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, there came an increased opportunity for the liberal joinder of claims in 
multiple claims actions.  This, in turn, demonstrated a need for relaxing the restrictions 
upon what should be treated as a judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.”); Cold 
Metal Process Co. v. United Co., 351 U.S. 455, 453 (1956) (“[t]he amended rule meets the 
needs and problems of modern judicial administration by adjusting the unit for appeal to 
fit multiple claims actions, while retaining a right of judicial review over the discretion 
exercised by the District Court . . . .”). 
 35 See Bergeron and Khula, supra note 5. 
 36 Howard B. Eisenberg and Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of 
Non-Final Orders: Its Time to Change the Rules, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999). 
 37 See Rebecca A. Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by “Manufacturing” A Final 
Judgment Through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979, 
981 (1997) (“In particular the, the trial and appellate courts’ practice of overlooking or 
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whether there is “practical” prejudice, or whether the non-adjudicated 
claims can be disregarded for purposes of finality because they are lost due 
to some external consideration (i.e. lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
expiration of the statute of limitations, etc . . . ).38  Yet others emphasize 
whether the non-adjudicated dismissals are for particular defendant(s), 
among a variety of other approaches and variations of the issue.39 
This article categorizes the circuits into three categories: (1) circuits 
rejecting manufactured finality;40 (2) circuits permitting manufactured 
finality;41 and (3) circuits applying a discretionary and manipulation based 
standard that allows limited forms of manufactured finality.42  These 
categories are referred to as the Ryan, the Per Se, and the Discretionary 
Standard rules respectively. 
After a brief introduction of each of these rules, seven major criteria 
are used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches 
listed.  The article ultimately argues in favor of a discretionary standard 
applied on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                                                                                                     
discounting language of dismissal with or without prejudice and examining instead the 
record to search for the litigants’ and trial judges’ intent is analyzed and found unwise, 
wasteful, and confusing.”). 
 38 See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary Dist., 629 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(statute of limitations expired) (citing Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 639 (7th 
Cir. 2008)); Manez v. Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC, 533 F.3d 578, 
583-84 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing without prejudice dismissal still created finality if the 
claims lack subject matter jurisdiction in that court or would be dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds); LNC Investments LLC v. Republic Nicaragua, 396 F.3d 342 (3d Cir. 
2005) (statute of limitations expired); see also Bennett Evan Cooper, “Manufacturing 
Finality” and the Right to Appeal in Federal Courts, ABA Appellate Practice Committee 
Newsletter Vol. 32  No.1 (December 18, 2012) (recognizing that dismissals of claims 
without prejudice can create finality in certain circuits because they are practically with 
prejudice). 
 39 See Cooper, supra note 38 (recognizing that certain jurisdictions have allowed 
dismissals without prejudice to manufacture finality where the dismissals are of all claims 
against a particular defendant or defendants).  For example, there is a circuit split as to 
whether parties should be able to appeal a partial judgment in consolidated cases under 
Rule 42(a).  Some circuits always allow parties to appeal a partial judgment of an action in 
a consolidated case by deeming the partial judgments – final under Section 1291.  Other 
circuits require the parties to seek a Rule 54(b) certificate to appeal the partial judgment. 
And yet others have determined that after consolidation, the only appealable judicial unit 
is an entire case – effectively denying all partial appeals in consolidated cases. See 
Jacqueline Gerson, The Appealability of Partial Judgments in Consolidated Cases, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1990) (discussing “three different conclusions on the 
appealability of uncertified partial judgments in consolidated cases”). 
 40 See infra note 44. 
 41 See infra note 48. 
 42 See infra notes 51. 
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A.  The Three Main Approaches to Manufactured Finality: the Ryan, Per 
Se, and Discretionary Standard Rules 
1.  Ryan Rule 
Perhaps the oldest and most traditional approach to manufactured 
finality is an approach rejecting all forms of it, referred to as the Ryan rule.  
The Ryan rule provides that circuit courts deny the exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction in all instances involving any form of manufactured finality – 
no matter how well intentioned or innocuous.  The name, the Ryan rule, is 
a reference to the rules origins in the 1978 Fifth Circuit case, Ryan v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp.43  The Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have been the traditional and strongest followers of this 
approach.44  In these circuits, if a party appeals a partial adjudication by 
                                                                                                                                     
 43 Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum, 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 44 See Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(denying an opportunity for plaintiff to appeal her third claim for relief dismissed with 
prejudice after being denied Rule 54(b) certification, and voluntarily dismissing her first 
two claims for relief without prejudice because the 10th Circuit, “agree[s] with the 
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.”).  The 10th Circuit explained that, “A plaintiff cannot be 
allowed to . . . voluntarily dismiss[] . . . her remaining claims and then appeal[] the claim 
that was dismissed with prejudice.” Id.; Rabbi Jacob Joseph Sch. v. Province of Mendoza, 
425 F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[t]he court observed that “it is well settled in this Circuit 
that, in general, a plaintiff cannot appeal an adverse decision on some claims by simply 
voluntarily dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice.”) ((citing Chappelle v. 
Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging multiple views on 
permitting appeal in the context of this article but ultimately stating that the court, “agree[d] 
with those courts that have precluded an appeal from a dismissal of some of a plaintiffs 
claims when the balance of his claims have been dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 
Rule 41(a) dismissal of the action.  A plaintiffs attempt to appeal a prior adverse 
determination following the dismissal of his remaining claims without prejudice 
necessarily implicates the policies of the final judgment rule.”)); see also Marshall v. 
Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[t]he [p]laintiffs’ problem 
with the strategy they employed is that it runs headlong into the ‘settled rule in the Fifth 
Circuit that appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order cannot be created by dismissing 
the remaining claims without prejudice.’ And, a Rule 41(a) dismissal without prejudice is 
not deemed to be a ‘final decision’ for the purposes of § 1291. This rule can be traced back 
to our decision in Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.”); Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253 
(2d Cir. 2003); Swope v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 281 F.3d 185, 192-193 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“It is settled rule in the Fifth Circuit that appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order 
cannot be created by dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice.  This rule 
originated in Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp . . . . hence, the Ryan rule requiring Rule 
54(b) certification to create finality will not prevent an appeal where one is warranted.”); 
State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 27-28 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The Court in Mesa agreed with the 
Fifth Circuit in Ryan that voluntary dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claim could not 
be considered a “final decision” under § 1291 because a voluntarily dismissal is without 
prejudice to the moving party filing those claims again . . . because plaintiffs never sought 
or received a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification and, thus, never received 
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dismissing non-adjudicated claims without prejudice, appellate courts will 
deny the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in every instance.45 
2.  Per Se Rule 
The next, and virtually opposite approach to finality is the Per Se 
rule.  A per se right to appeal provides that circuit courts exercise their 
appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding the presence of virtually any form 
of manufactured finality.46  This approach has been dubbed a per se right 
to appeal based on Judge Emmitt Cox’s concurring opinion in the case 
State Treasurer of the State of Mich. v. Barry.47  The First, Sixth, Eighth, 
and D.C. Circuits have traditionally and to varying extents followed this 
approach.48   In these circuits, if a party appeals a partial adjudication and 
                                                                                                                                     
a final decision, plaintiffs had nothing to appeal . . . The Mesa court also emphasized Ryan’s 
conclusion that ‘[i]n the absence of a rule 54(b) certification, the earlier decisions were not 
appealable.’”); Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The plain language 
of Rule 54(b) . . . [controls where] the court disposed of “fewer than all claims” on the 
merits . . . Thus Rule 54(b), not § 1291, provides Plaintiffs’ with the means for appeal in 
[that] case.”); cf. Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333, 1339 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 712-713(D.C. Circuit 2005) 
(district court order granting summary judgment on some claims but dismissing the 
remaining claim without prejudice subject to reconsideration was not a dismissal of the 
action and was not final and appealable))(recognizing precedent which both accepts and 
rejects manufactured finality, but denying jurisdiction in that case solely because the parties 
dismissed the remaining claims by stipulation but without district court approval). 
 45 See supra note 44. 
 46 See infra note 48. 
 47 State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999)(Cox, J., 
concurring). 
 48 See Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2006) (“we conclude that the 
voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims made the two earlier summary judgment orders 
final for purposes of this appeal.  After the voluntary dismissal, there was nothing left for 
the district court to resolve, and the suit had ended as far as that court was concerned, 
thereby creating a final judgment.”); Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 
412 F.3d 156, 158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (permitting manufactured finality), cited in 
Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3e 1333, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(which rejected manufactured finality, but declined to conclusively adjudicate the issue one 
way or the other); J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 
76 F.3d 1245, 1250 (1st Cir. 1996); Hicks v. NLO, Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(“Generally, where the trial court allows the plaintiff to dismiss his or her own action 
without prejudice, the judgment is final for appeal purposes . . . [t]herefore, we hold that 
plaintiff’s dismissal with the concurrence of the court of the only count of her complaint 
which remained unadjudicated imparted finality to the District Court’s earlier order 
granting summary judgment.”); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Thomas Auto Co., 939 F.2d 538 
(8th Cir. 1991) (“[f]ollowing the granting of the motion for partial summary judgment, the 
court, on the parties’ joint motion to dismiss and stipulation of dismissal filed pursuant to 
[Rule] 41, dismissed without prejudice the remainder of the case.  Chrysler Motors Corp. 
v. Thomas Auto Co., No. LR-C-88-718 (E.D. Ark. Jul. 25, 1990) (order of dismissal). The 
effect of that action was to make the judgment granting partial summary judgment a final 
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dismisses non-adjudicated claims without prejudice, appellate courts will 
exercise appellate jurisdiction.49 
3.  Discretionary Standard 
The third approach applies a discretionary and manipulation–based 
standard to manufactured finality, and is referred to as the Discretionary 
Standard.  This rule provides that circuit courts may review manufactured 
final judgments, but only if there is an absence of intent to manipulate 
appellate jurisdiction.50  Traditionally, only the Ninth and Federal Circuits 
have followed this approach, although, others have occasionally used it in 
some form, as well.51 Under this approach, if a party appeals a partial 
                                                                                                                                     
judgment for purposes of appeal, even though the district court had not so certified under 
[Rule] 54(b).”); Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Circuit 
1988) (permitting manufactured finality although not directly addressing the issue in the 
opinion); Merchants & Planters Bank v. Smith, 516 F.2d 355, 356 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975); cf. 
Acton v. City of Columbia, Mo., 436 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2006) (disapproving of the 
use of a dismissal without prejudice to create what is in substance an impermissible 
interlocutory appeal,  but noting that their prior case law did not foreclose that possibility); 
Porter v. Williams, 436 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2006) (permitting manufactured finality); 
Morris v. Crawford County, Ark., 299 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting 
manufactured finality); Great Rivers Coop. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 
198 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[t]hough we strongly disapprove of this use of a 
dismissal without prejudice to create what is in substance an impermissible interlocutory 
appeal, our prior case law did not foreclose that effort here”). 
 49 See supra note 48. 
 50 See infra note 51. 
 51 See also James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing a circuit split and advocating for allowing appeal of partial judgments after 
dismissal of remaining claims without prejudice when there is an absence of intent to 
manipulate appellate jurisdiction as evidenced by district court participation in the 
dismissal, for example by continuing the statute of limitations and laches clocks on the 
dismissed claims, as well as a lack of intent to circumvent Rule 54(b)); West v. Macht, 197 
F.3d 1185, 1189 (7th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging inter- and intra-circuit conflict on whether 
partial judgments can be appealed after dismissing remaining claims without prejudice, and 
ruling that a plaintiff obtaining informa pauperis (IFP) status on some but not all claims 
could not dismiss his viable claims to create a final judgment for purposes of appealing the 
denials of IFP status); State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 
1102, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal); Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 714-
715 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 
1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying appeal); United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884 
(7th Cir. 1993); Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1433 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(dismissing appeal); Cheng v. Commissioner, 878 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying 
appeal); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing 
appeal); Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984) (disallowing the appeal of orders 
quashing writs of execution after appellants’ causes of action were dismissed for want of 
prosecution); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979) (disallowing appeal 
after class certification was denied and the appellants’ causes of action were dismissed for 
want of prosecution); Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding an intent 
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adjudication and dismisses non-adjudicated claims without prejudice, the 
appellate court will accept or deny the exercise of appellate jurisdiction 
depending on whether there is an intent to manipulate appellate 
jurisdiction.52 
B.  Evaluation Criteria 
Circuit courts throughout the country have grappled with the issue of 
manufactured finality for many years, without Supreme Court guidance on 
the issue.  As a result, the case law has developed and been applied in a 
variety of different ways leading to circuit splits53 and in some cases, intra-
circuit divides.54  Nonetheless, there have been several important 
                                                                                                                                     
to manipulate appellate jurisdiction: after a party sought Rule 54(b) certification but was 
denied, the party dismissed the remaining claims without informing the district court, filed 
a simultaneous appeal and before the appeal was even considered, re-filed the dismissed 
portion as a separate lawsuit); Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 
F.2d 1264, 1266 n.1 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (allowing appeal); see also infra notes 
63-66, 217 (acknowledging a more recent and open use of the standard by the Eighth 
Circuit and de facto uses of the standard in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits).  But see JTC 
Petroleum Co. v. Plasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 1999); International 
Marketing Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 192 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 1999); Fassett 
v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting appeal of partial 
judgment after the statute of limitations had run on remaining claims, but finding, 
nonetheless, that an expired statute of limitations is not required for permitting appeal); 
Cape May Green, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1983) (granting the plaintiff the 
right to appeal after losing on all its claims against all the defendants even when one of the 
defendants dismissed its cross-claim against another defendant without prejudice); Charles 
Alan Wright, et al., 15A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.8, at 623-26 (2d ed. 
1992 & Supp. 1999).  See generally Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(citing Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d 1347, (Fed. Cir. 2003) (where the Federal Circuit 
identified several paths to appellate review of a partial judgment including: proceeding to 
trial, seeking Rule 54(b) certification, dismissal without prejudice of remaining claims, and 
1292 (b) review)) (allowing appeal of a partial judgment after dismissal of remaining 
claims without prejudice). 
 52 See supra note 51; see also infra notes 141–47 (listing criteria). 
 53 See supra notes 44–51. 
 54 See generally supra notes 39, 43, 46 and infra notes 189, 216-24.  The Second 
Circuit has traditionally followed Ryan, but recently permitted conditional finality.  The 
Third Circuit has recognized manufactured finality in earlier opinions, and more recently 
rejected manufactured and conditional finality.  The Fifth Circuit originated the Ryan rule, 
but has recognized certain exceptions and permitted manufactured finality, as well as 
appeals of claims dismissed with conditions that amount to “legal prejudice.”  The Sixth 
Circuit has traditionally followed a Per Se approach, but recently rejected conditional 
finality.  The Seventh Circuit has recently followed the Ryan rule, rejected conditional 
finality, but permitted manufactured finality in the past.  The Eighth Circuit has in some 
cases used what appears to be forms of the Ryan, Per Se, and Discretionary Standard 
approaches. The Ninth Circuit used a Discretionary Standard as of 2002, but originally 
rejected manufactured finality, and currently rejects conditional finality.  The Eleventh 
Circuit has been a traditional follower of the Ryan rule, but has recently acknowledged 
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overlapping factors courts consider regardless of which rule they apply in 
their circuit. 
Below is a comparison of the three approaches based upon seven of 
those factors.  Specifically the section below examines the three 
approaches to manufactured finality in light of: (1) the circuits’ varying 
philosophies towards the final judgment rule; (2) interplay with Rule 
54(b); (3) piecemeal litigation; (4) the effect on district courts; (5) the 
effect on appellate courts; (6) the effect on party rights; and (7) the 
treatment of conditional finality. 
Each is addressed in turn and in certain cases, when appropriate, the 
rules are compared and contrasted individually, in groups, or by 
membership in a group category. 
1.  The Final Judgment Rule: Strict versus Pragmatic Finality 
a. The Ryan Rule: Strict Finality 
28 U.S.C Section 1291 states that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall 
have jurisdiction of appeal from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the United States . . . .”55  A strict view of finality, as used in jurisdictions 
following the Ryan rule, is based on the historic understanding that a final 
judgment only exists if all claims have been decided on the merits or 
dismissed with prejudice.56 
As a textual endeavor, proponents of a strict finality rationale have 
emphasized the word final in “final decision” and “final judgment rule” as 
justification for rejection of all forms of manufactured finality.57  This 
                                                                                                                                     
certain exceptions and permitted manufactured finality in those limited cases.  The D.C. 
Circuit has not taken a definitive stance, but recently rejected manufactured finality where 
the parties dismissed their claims without court approval, but has permitted the practice in 
other instances. 
 55 28 U.S.C § 1291 (2013). 
 56 Cf. THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS, § 3.02 Final-Decision Requirement, ( Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009) 
(acknowledging that a complete emphasis on the word “final” in final decision or the final 
judgment rule in § 1291 leads to a strict interpretation of finality, which requires district 
court proceedings to proceed to termination before appellate review).  Mr. Baker also 
recognizes, however, that a complete emphasis on the word “decision” in “final decision” 
would lead to the opposite extreme, where every district court ruling would be appealable.  
Id.   The author ultimately concludes a proper interpretation of finality is one that strikes a 
balance between these two opposite views. Id. 
 57 See id.; see also State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (citing Chapelle v. Beacon Comm’s Corp., 84 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1996); Cook v. 
Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“Ryan’s rule is sound, 
consistent with § 1291, which provides for appellate jurisdiction over only a ‘final 
decision,’ and is followed by two other circuits.”). 
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view is based on faithfulness to a historic and ‘true’ concept of finality in 
line with the traditional idea that an appellate court’s work begins only 
after there is a complete and final adjudication of all claims on the merits 
by the district court.58  The Supreme Court has held that a decision is not 
final unless it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment.”59 
Applying this rationale, a rejection of manufactured finality is not 
surprising.  When parties dismiss non-adjudicated claims without 
prejudice, the claims may be re-filed, as long as the statute of limitations 
has not expired.60  As a result, according to this view, as long as the claims 
can be re-filed, the district court’s job is not yet complete, appellate review 
is premature, and there is no truly “final judgment.”.61 
Nonetheless, even though some have argued Ryan is clear, the strict 
finality rationale has been inconsistently applied.62  For example, in cases 
where non-adjudicated claims are dismissed without prejudice before a 
partial adjudication, as opposed to after, the appellate courts have 
exercised jurisdiction.  This has happened, even though the dismissed 
claims could still technically be re-filed.63  Similarly, exceptions to strict 
                                                                                                                                     
 58 See BAKER, supra note 56. 
 59 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 232 (1945). 
 60 Barry, 168 F.3d at 12 (citing Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
In Barry, the 11th Circuit recognized that 
The Court in Mesa agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Ryan that voluntary 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claim could not be considered a ‘final 
decision’ under § 1291 because a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice to 
the moving party filing those claims again . . . The Court in Mesa reasoned 
that no final decision had been entered, because the remaining claim, which 
was dismissed without prejudice, could be resurrected . . . .  Dismissing the 
appeal in Construction Aggregates for lack of jurisdiction, this Court held that 
there was no final decision from which to appeal, in light of the defendant’s 
ability to re-file its second counterclaim, which had been dismissed without 
prejudice. 
Id. (citing Construction Aggregate, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th 
Cir. 1998)); see also id. at 13 (“The parties, and the concurrence here, advocate that a 
dismissal without prejudice is a ‘good pillar to support implied final judgment under Jetco.’ 
We disagree . . . in Jetco, the two orders left nothing that could be re-filed, [but] if the 
appeal failed in Mesa or Ryan, the plaintiff could re-file other claims.”). 
 61 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 12 (citing Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 (11th Cir. 
1995)). 
 62 See infra notes 63–67. 
 63 See e.g., Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).  In Schoenfeld, the 
plaintiff brought causes of action for gender discrimination against two government 
officials after failing to get a position at the United States Department of the Interior, Fish 
and Wildlife Services. Id. at 1265–66.  The plaintiff dismissed each causes of action against 
one of the defendants without prejudice, and later lost on the second defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment covering all remaining counts in the complaint. Id. In deciding there 
was jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the adverse summary judgment ruling, the court 
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finality have been made for dismissals of entire actions without 
prejudice,64 dismissals without prejudice of claims due to misjoinder,65 and 
in cases involving dismissals of non-adjudicated claims without prejudice 
due to a lack of an indispensable party66 or due to a party’s desire to litigate 
those claims in state courts.67 
b.  The Per Se & Discretionary Standard Rules: Pragmatic Finality 
In contrast to the Ryan approach, the Per Se and discretionary rules 
openly apply a pragmatic and policy–based approach to finality.68  Circuits 
using this approach have emphasized that, ultimately, the final judgment 
rule is a rule, designed to balance the underlying competing policy 
interests of finality – the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on 
the one hand, and the danger of denying justice by delaying appellate 
review on the other.69  As for the pragmatic considerations, these 
                                                                                                                                     
reasoned that because “[S]choenfeld dismissed the claim against [the first defendant] 
without prejudice [and] before the district court entered the order granting summary 
judgment [in favor of the second defendant] . . . [t]he district court order granting summary 
judgment adjudicated all the claims against all the remaining parties[;]” thus, “[t]here 
was . . . no reason for the district court to even consider . . . Rule 54(b).”  Id.  The court 
then found that the situation was “distinct from the one covered by Ryan . . . .”  Id. at 1266. 
 64 LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding an appealable 
final judgment despite the fact that an entire action was voluntarily dismissed without 
prejudice by the plaintiff’s attorney after the plaintiff went missing, because the dismissal 
was subject to conditions imposed by the district court which amounted to the requisite 
“legal prejudice” needed for finality); see also Kirkland v. National Mortg. Network, Inc., 
884 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1989) (allowing appeal of an order revoking attorney’s pro hac 
vice status where the party dismissed its entire action without prejudice).  In Kirkland, the 
lead plaintiff in a class action brought claims for an alleged violation of the Truth-in-
Lending Act, as well as other causes of action stemming from a $15,000 loan made by a 
national mortgage company to the plaintiff. Id. at 1369. In the course of the litigation, the 
district court revoked the lead plaintiff’s attorney’s pro hac vice status. Id.  Later, the 
plaintiffs obtained a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal (with court approval) of their entire action 
without prejudice. Id. at 1367-68.  After the dismissal, the attorney sought appellate review 
of the district court’s pro hac vice revocation. Id. In that case, the circuit court found the 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the revocation order was proper because a dismissal 
without prejudice is a final judgment.  Id. 
 65 See Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 66 See Equity Inv. Partners, Lp v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 67 See Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 68 The Supreme Court has recognized a pragmatic approach to finality.  See Brown 
Shoes Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962).  In that case the court stated: 
The Court has adopted essentially practical tests for identifying those 
judgments which are, and those which are not, to be considered “final.”  A 
pragmatic approach to the question of finality has been considered essential 
to the achievement of the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action,”: the touchstones of federal procedure. Id. (citations omitted). 
 69 See id. 
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jurisdictions have also recognized the final judgment rule creates a 
division of labor between district and appellate courts, and that 
manufactured finality still creates a final judgment in the sense that there 
is “nothing for the court to do but execute judgment.”70  These jurisdictions 
balance the historic concerns against premature appeals against the 
potential injustice that can result from denying appellate review of a 
manufactured final judgment.71 
In practice, appellate courts advancing pragmatic finality have still 
placed limits on judgments manufactured for finality by exercising 
jurisdiction only where remaining claims are dismissed with the district 
court’s approval, and are subject to the statute of limitations.72  Even in 
                                                                                                                                     
 70 See also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); Marianne Fogarty, The 
Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 
637, 644 nn. 52-53 (1988), (describing the avenues under § 1292(a)-(b) to appeal, and 
judicially created exceptions to the final judgment rule including: (1) The All Writs Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982); (2) the Cohen collateral order doctrine, Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); (3) the Forgay doctrine, Forgay v. 
Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204-06; (4) the Wood doctrine, United States v. Wood, 295 
F.3d 772, 776-78 (5th Cir. 1977); and (5) the death knell doctrine, Jetco Elec. Indus. V. 
Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973)); cf. THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, § 3.01 Appeals From Final Decisions – 
Civil, (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009) (“Functionally, the [finality] requirement structures 
the relationship between appellate court and trial court; within this relationship, each court 
performs its complementary role.”). 
 71 See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 892 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting). According to the dissent in Dastar Corp., 
What the majority ignore[d] is that the inquiry into whether a decision is final 
requires evaluation of the competing considerations underlying all questions 
of finality — ‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one 
hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.’ Our own 
pragmatic approach to the issue of finality recognizes these competing 
considerations by allowing parties to voluntarily dismiss claims without 
prejudice prior to appeal, absent a finding of manipulation.  Thus, the purpose 
of such a dismissal is to support efficiency, not undermine it. 
Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)) (citing 
James v. Price Stern, 283 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 72 See e.g., Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (declining to decide the issue of manufactured finality conclusively, but denying 
jurisdiction in that case because a lack of district court approval); see also Hicks v. NLO, 
Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Therefore, we hold that plaintiff’s dismissal with 
the concurrence of the court of the only count of her complaint which remained 
unadjudicated imparted finality to the District Court’s earlier order granting summary 
judgment.”); cf. supra note 38 (acknowledging situations where courts grant jurisdiction 
notwithstanding dismissals without prejudice in Ryan jurisdictions because the statute of 
limitations has expired on the claims dismissed).  See generally State Treasurer of State of 
Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 20-21 (11th Cir. 1999) (Cox, J., concurring) (“Voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice is not, after all, a freebie from the litigant’s point of view.  
When the litigant re-files [sic] the claims, he could face meritorious statute-of limitations 
arguments . . . ). 
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Discretionary Standard review cases where other factors are present, 
courts have focused on these two factors.73 
Nonetheless, in some Per Se and Discretionary Standard cases, the 
failure of the district court to approve the dismissals has neither been 
dispositive, nor an absolute bar to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.74  
For example circuit courts have exercised appellate jurisdiction over 
unilateral dismissals without prejudice made as a matter of right using 
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which can only be used if an opponent has not yet 
filed an answer or motion for summary judgment.75 
On the other hand, the majority of Per Se and Discretionary Standard 
jurisdictions have taken a hard–line stance to ensure that the statute of 
limitations continues to run on any non-adjudicated claims dismissed 
without prejudice.76  As a result, in cases involving any impediment to the 
statute of limitations, even for a limited period of time, the courts in Per 
Se and Discretionary Standard jurisdictions generally find manipulation 
and decline to exercise jurisdiction.77  The practical affect of this approach 
is to deny appellate jurisdiction to dismissals made with “conditional 
prejudice,” where dismissals of non adjudicated claims “without 
prejudice” become “with prejudice,” but only if a party’s appeal of 
adjudicated claims is unsuccessful.  Conditional dismissals admittedly 
interrupt the statute of limitations clock during the pendency of appeals.78 
More recently additional limitations have been put in place, as some 
panels using a pragmatic view of finality have declined appellate 
                                                                                                                                     
 73 See also Romoland School Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy, 548 F.3d 738, 748 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 1352-54 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasizing 
statute of limitations as barrier to refiling); James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 
1065-1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing statute of limitations and district court participation 
as factors weighing in favor of granting jurisdiction); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks 
Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting jurisdiction in part due to mitigation of statute 
of limitations risk); Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying 
jurisdiction where there was no district court approval of the dismissals without prejudice).  
See generally Sneller v. Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 74 See Duke Energy Trading & Marketing v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 
2001) (granting jurisdiction even without district court approval where dismissed claims 
were refiled in state courts); see also State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene, 
164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999) (granting jurisdiction even without district court approval of 
claims dismissed without prejudice where claims were re-filed in a state court). 
 75 See Duke, 267 F.3d at 1048-50; Coeur D’Alene, 164 F.3d 1102. 
 76 Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. and Snap Prepaid, LLC v. Owl Wireless, LLC, NO. 12-
4551, NO. 12-4565 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2013) (rejecting conditional dismissals for 
undermining the concept of finality, Rule 54(b) and Section 1292, contributing to 
successive appeals, and avoiding statute of limitations risks). See generally supra notes 72-
73. 
 77 See generally id. 
 78 See generally id. 
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jurisdiction in complex-multi-party cases, and in situations involving 
deceptive multi-step dismissals.79 
2. Rule 54(b) 
When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether 
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or 
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however 
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action 
as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time 
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all 
the parties’ rights and liabilities.80 
a. Ryan Rule: Preserving Rule 54(b) 
Despite the Ryan rule’s strict finality rationale, adherents argue that 
the rule is not unreasonable because of the availability of Rule 54(b) for 
early appellate review.81  In fact, a strong justification for the Ryan rule is 
based on a desire to prevent parties from avoiding and undermining Rule 
54(b) through the use of manufactured finality.82  For example, the Tenth 
Circuit has found: 
                                                                                                                                     
 79 See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp, 318 F.3d 881, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 80 FED R. CIV. P. 54(B). 
 81 See infra note 82. 
 82 State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14–16 (11th Cir. 1999).  
In Barry, the majority found: 
Our precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here ‘would 
undermine the policies of judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal litigation, 
and district court independence that are the basis of the final judgment 
rule’ . . . [r]repealing Ryan’s rule significantly erodes Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) 
allows the district court to control its docket and to make an independent 
determination whether an exception to the final decision rule is warranted in 
an individual case under appropriate circumstances . . . what is not conjecture 
is that abrogation of Ryan’s rule will subvert Rule 54(b) and result in the 
parties, not the trial court’s, controlling what interim orders are appealed and 
when . . . [o]ne countervailing concern is ‘the specter of repeated appeals by 
litigants who dismiss claims in order to appeal and then resurrect them on 
remand in another action. 
 
[T]his circuit’s bright-line rule fosters predictability . . . [t]he final decision 
rule is well known and longstanding.  It is clear, easy to follow, and promotes 
judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal appeals.  Most importantly, the rule 
as it stands today is consistent with Rule 54(b), is faithful to the statutory 
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A plaintiff cannot be allowed to undermine the requirements of 
Rule 54(b) by seeking voluntary dismissal of her remaining claims 
and then appealing the claim that was dismissed with prejudice.  
[The plaintiff] has attempted to subvert the requirements of Rule 
54(b) by voluntarily dismissing her first and second claims when 
the district court would not grant certification on her third claim 
for relief. 83 
The essence of the argument is that by allowing parties to 
manufacture finality, they obtain an end-around Rule 54(b).84  This is 
because they can always dismiss non-adjudicated claims without 
prejudice, obtain appellate review, and avoid having to satisfying Rule 
54(b)’s two main requirements: (1) that the adjudicated claim is a 
“separate claim for relief”; and (2) that there is “no just reason for delay” 
of the adjudicated claim’s review.85 
b.  Per Se and Discretionary Standard: Manufactured Finality as a 
Complement to Rule 54(b). 
Although it is true that manufactured finality creates an alternate 
route to appellate review, it may be unfair to characterize the route as an 
“end-around.”  Rule 54(b) appeals are still the only “risk-free” way a party 
can have its cake and it eat it too – that is, obtain appellate review for the 
partial adjudication while simultaneously continuing pursuit of any non-
adjudicated claims at the district court.86 This is because manufactured 
finality carries statute of limitations risks for non-adjudicated claims 
dismissed without prejudice while Rule 54(b) does not. 
In this way, manufactured finality comes with fewer disadvantages 
in comparison to Rule 54(b) than anticipated.87  In some cases, parties will 
                                                                                                                                     
language and policies underlying § 1291, and allows the district courts to 
retain control of their dockets. 
Id.; see also Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (“Were we to permit the parties’ dismissal without prejudice to generate an 
appealable judgment, we would effectively transfer to the litigants the “dispatcher” 
function that Rule 54(b) vests in the district courts.”); Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767 
(10th Cir. 1998) (“Thus Rule 54(b), not § 1291, provides Plaintiffs [sic] with the means for 
appeal in this case.”). 
 83 Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(following Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 84 See supra notes 82–83. 
 85 See supra notes 82–83. 
 86 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 20 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 87 See James C. Martin & Jayne E. Fleming, Can You or Can’t You: Review of Partial 
Judgments Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(B), ABA APP. PRAC. J. Vol. 
XXV, No. 1 (Spring 2006).  The authors acknowledge that Rule 54(b) jurisprudence 
involve substantial analysis to determine if there is “more than one claim for relief” and 
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be best served by “proving” their desire for appellate review by taking the 
risk that any non-adjudicated claims dismissed without prejudice will be 
lost due to the statute of limitations, unlike situations where appellate 
review is obtained through Rule 54(b), where the statute of limitations risk 
of losing non-adjudicated claims is not present.88 
3. Judicial Efficiency & Piecemeal Litigation 
Two of the most historic and significant considerations in appellate 
procedure are judicial efficiency and piecemeal litigation.89  In this article, 
                                                                                                                                     
“no just reason for delay.”  Circuits vary on how to determine if there is more than one 
claim for relief.  Some circuits look at the degree of factual overlap between claims, others 
look to the nature of relief sought by the claims, and others determine if treating the claims 
separately would be contrary to claim-splitting rules.  Some circuits look at the similarity 
of legal and factual issues.  The authors note that the “no just cause for delay” standard is 
also a subject of controversy.  At a minimum, “[t]he bare recitation of the “no just cause 
for delay” standard found in the text of Rule 54(b) is not sufficient, by itself, to properly 
certify an issue for immediate appeal.” Instead appellate courts are forced to look at the 
district court record and consider factors such as the judiciary’s administrative interests, 
the parties equitable considerations, and whether granting certification will allow the 
circuit courts to avoid having to determine: (1) the same issue more than once; (2) any 
questions that remain at the trial court; and (3) any issues that will become moot by future 
developments in the case.  Id. Rule 54(b) jurisprudence also treats judgments determining 
liability but not damages differently depending on the circuit. The Second, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have ruled judgments are not final if they decide only 
liability and leave open the question of relief.  The Seventh circuit follows this general rule, 
but creates an exception, allowing a finality designation in cases where the computation of 
damages is mechanical and unlikely to produce another appeal. Despite following the 
general rule against considering liability findings without damages determinations final, 
the Fifth circuit has ruled an order requiring a defendant to pay the plaintiff royalties was 
a final judgment – even though the district court failed to quantify the amount of royalties 
owed.  Id.; see also Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(B): Seventy-Five And Ready For 
Retirement, 65 FL. L.REV. 711, 714-17 (2013)(arguing that Rule 54(B) should be “retired” 
in favor of a discretionary approach because there is uncertainty about what constitutes a 
separate claim, the level of articulation necessary to obtain certification, and disagreement 
about the standards to be applied with the rule and that a lack of Supreme Court clarification 
and attention to the rule has led parties to over-aggressively appeal for fear of losing 
appellate rights, and on the other extreme, to sitting on appellate rights and losing the ability 
to appeal.). 
 88 See supra note 87. 
 89 See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).  The Court 
found in that case: 
[The] struggle of the courts [is] sometimes to devise a formula that will 
encompass all situations and at other times to take hardship cases out from 
under the rigidity of previous declarations; sometimes choosing one and 
sometimes another of the considerations that always compete in the question 
of appealability, the most important of which are the inconvenience and costs 
of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by 
delay on the other. 
Id.; see also Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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piecemeal litigation is a reference to the filing and re-filing of claims in 
different district courts.90  Piecemeal appeals on the other hand, involve 
the concern that parties will continuously appeal district court 
adjudications on a repeated and continuous basis.91 
a. Horizontal Piecemeal Litigation 
i. The Ryan Rule & Horizontal Piecemeal Litigation Concerns 
Perhaps the biggest advantage claimed by advocates of the Ryan rule 
is the prevention of horizontal piecemeal litigation.92  Specifically, the rule 
prevents parties from dismissing non-adjudicated claims without prejudice 
and re-filing them in another district court.93 
Instead, parties seeking appellate review in Ryan jurisdictions can 
dismiss non-adjudicated claims with prejudice, litigate non-adjudicated 
claims to resolution, or obtain a Rule 54(b) certificate for early appellate 
review.94  Nonetheless, whether the parties dismiss with prejudice, litigate 
remaining claims to finality, or obtain Rule 54(b) approval, the path to 
appellate review prevents a party from re-filing non-adjudicated claims in 
a different district court; thus, entirely eliminating horizontal piecemeal 
litigation concerns.95 
ii. The Per Se & Discretionary Standards: Manufactured Finality & 
Horizontal Piecemeal Litigation Concerns 
On the other hand, in Per Se and Discretionary Standard 
jurisdictions, which permit manufactured finality, there is a risk of 
horizontal piecemeal litigation.96  Although in some, if not many or most 
cases, practical, common sense, and statute of limitations concerns will 
temper the decision to re-file non-adjudicated claims dismissed without 
prejudice there is still the potential for abuse of manufactured finality.97 
For example, imagine a party has manufactured a final judgment to 
obtain appellate review, and then immediately re-filed its non-adjudicated 
                                                                                                                                     
 90 This is essentially the re-filing concern. 
 91 This is the concern that appeals will be filed too early, and that cases will reappear 
before the appellate courts multiple times for multiple different reasons. 
 92 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 12 (citing Mesa v. 
United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 (11th Cir. 1995)).. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14-15 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 95 If the remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice, that is considered an 
adjudication on the merits, and the claims are lost.  See generally id. 
 96 See infra notes 98–115. 
 97 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 20–21 (Cox, J., concurring). 
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claims in a different state or federal court.  The party has not only avoided 
the requirements of Rule 54(b), but also successfully shopped for a new 
district court to hear its non-adjudicated claims while simultaneously 
obtaining appellate review. 
A nuanced variation of this scenario took place in State of Missouri 
ex. Rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe.98  In Coeur D’Alene, the State of 
Missouri sued the Coeur D’Alene tribe and a privately affiliated 
corporation in Missouri state court.99  The State of Missouri alleged the 
two defendants conducted an unlawful Internet gambling program with 
Missouri residents in violation of Missouri state gambling laws.100 
The tribe and its affiliate removed the case to a federal district court 
in Missouri, and successfully prevented a remand back to state court.  The 
tribe was also able to have all claims against it dismissed based on the 
doctrine of tribal immunity.101  The claims against the other defendant 
were not dismissed however, because the district court refused to extend 
tribal immunity to a tribal agent.102 
Soon after, the State of Missouri dismissed its non-adjudicated 
claims against the tribal affiliate without prejudice and appealed the 
district court’s orders denying remand and granting the Coeur D’Alene 
tribal immunity.103  With the appeal pending, the State of Missouri then 
re-filed its non-adjudicated claims against the tribe’s affiliate in a separate 
state court action, this time adding two tribal leaders.  The tribal affiliate 
removed the case again, and eventually had the action transferred to the 
same federal district court which presided over the State of Missouri’s 
original suit.104  Even after being aware of the State of Missouri’s dismissal 
and re-filing of the non-adjudicated claims against the tribal affiliate, the 
Eighth Circuit exercised appellate jurisdiction and reviewed the district 
court’s orders denying remand and granting the Coeur D’Alene tribal 
immunity.105 
A similar “re-filing” scenario also took place in Fletcher v. 
Gagosian.106  In that case, the plaintiffs were court-appointed trustees of a 
California corporation undergoing bankruptcy.107  After plaintiffs filed an 
                                                                                                                                     
 98 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 99 Id. at 1105. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1104. 
 102 Id. at 1109. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Coeur D’Alene, 164 F.3d at 1110. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 107 Id. at 638–39. 
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amended two-count complaint against multiple defendants for insider 
trading, the district court dismissed the first count of the complaint and a 
single defendant from the second count.108  The plaintiffs sought Rule 
54(b) and Section 1292(b) interlocutory appeals of the district court’s 
adjudications, but both were denied.109 
Soon after, the plaintiffs manufactured finality by dismissing the 
non-adjudicated portions of the complaint without prejudice.110  A notice 
of appeal followed.111  Similar to Coeur D’Alene, the plaintiffs dismissed 
their complaint without court approval invoking Rule 41(a)(1), which 
permits voluntary dismissals of non-adjudicated claims without prejudice 
as a matter of right if no answer or motion for summary judgment has yet 
been filed in a case.112 The plaintiffs then re-filed their dismissed claims 
as a separate lawsuit. 113  Unlike the Eighth Circuit however, the Ninth 
Circuit, declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction.114  The court explained: 
 
[I]f we accept appellants’ rationale, then we also accept the notion 
that the policies against multiplicity of litigation and against 
piecemeal appeals may be avoided at the whim of a plaintiff.  He 
need merely dismiss portions of his complaint without prejudice, 
appeal from what had been an interlocutory order, and re-file the 
dismissed portion as a separate lawsuit.  That is precisely what 
appellants did here.115 
Overall, even if situations like Coeur D’Alene and Gagosian are 
uncommon, left “unregulated,” manufactured finality has the potential to 
seriously undermine district courts, and create unacceptable risks of 
horizontal piecemeal litigation.116 
b.  Vertical Piecemeal Litigation 
i.  The Ryan Rule & Vertical Piecemeal Litigation Concerns 
Traditionally, the Ryan rule is known for enhancing judicial 
efficiency while reducing and or entirely eliminating the risk that a party 
                                                                                                                                     
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Fletcher, 604 F.2d at 638–39. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 639. 
 116 See State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 
1999); Fletcher, 604 F.2d 637. 
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may file successive appeals and invoke appellate review of bits and pieces 
of district court rulings.117 
Proponents of the Ryan rule point out that in order to obtain early 
appellate review, parties have two options even if Rule 54(b) review is 
denied.  First, parties can dismiss non-adjudicated claims with 
prejudice.118  Second, they litigate non-adjudicated claims to their 
resolution at the trial court.119  In both cases, there is concern that appellate 
courts will be bothered by multiple appeals from issues arising in the same 
case.120 
ii.  The Per Se & Discretionary Standards & Vertical Piecemeal 
Litigation Concerns 
Although the arguments in the immediately preceding section may 
be technically true, the issue of piecemeal litigation shouldn’t be viewed 
in a vacuum. 
First, in situations where a party’s peripheral non-adjudicated claims 
are intended to supplement and “bolster” an adjudicated claim, litigating 
                                                                                                                                     
 117 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 16 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(“Lastly, this Circuit has followed Ryan ‘s rule for almost twenty-five years. Any 
procedural rule will engender policy arguments and the final decision rule is no exception. 
The final decision rule is well known and longstanding. It is clear, easy to follow, and 
promotes judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal appeals.”). 
 118 See id. at 15.  The majority found: 
Instead, if a Rule 54(b) certificate is denied, Ryan’s rule forces litigants to 
make hard choices and seriously evaluate their cases. The parties must assess 
the likelihood of a reversal of the adjudicated claims on appeal versus the 
likelihood of success on the remaining claims at trial. While some claims in 
lawsuits are close, many are not. Litigants often have to make much more 
difficult choices in the course of complex litigation. In order to appeal a 
court’s rulings on some claims, a party may settle the remaining claims in 
some fashion and dismiss them with prejudice. Such a settlement might even 
incorporate a high or low amount on the remaining claims dismissed with 
prejudice, contingent upon the outcome of the appeal. As the concurrence 
notes, perhaps the remaining claims are not winners on their merits, but only 
offered other tactical advantages. A party seeking an appeal either has to give 
up that tactical advantage to gain the benefit of finality or has to convince the 
other party to do so. In fact, the options of resolving the dilemma faced by the 
parties are endless and only limited by the settlement creativity of the parties. 
Id. 
 119 See id. at 20 (Cox, J, concurring). 
 120 If the remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice, the only appeal will be of the 
partial judgment.  On the other hand, if the remaining claims are adjudicated to resolution 
at the district court, appeal of the partial judgment and any remaining claims will be a part 
of a traditional final judgment. 
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the non-adjudicated claims to resolution is an inefficient use of judicial 
resources if the adjudicated claim is ultimately lost.121 
For example, in cases involving third-party liability or cases 
involving indemnification, a defendant’s claims against a third-party 
defendant may only be relevant if the defendant is still potentially liable 
for the underlying cause of action.122  In the case that  a defendant prevails 
on summary judgment against a plaintiff and an appellate court affirms 
that decision, there would be no reason to pursue a third-party complaint 
against a third-party defendant for indemnification or contribution.123  In 
those cases, early appellate review is the missing ingredient necessary for 
the parties to make a meaningful choice about the pursuit of non-
adjudicated peripheral claims to trial. 
Second, in Ryan circuits, without the option of manufacturing 
finality, early appellate review requires Rule 54(b) approval or the use of 
an alternative appellate doctrine.  But Rule 54(b) and its alternatives are 
merely codified versions of vertical piecemeal litigation, since district 
court proceedings on the non-adjudicated claims continue while the 
appellate court reviews an adjudicated claim.124  Rule 54(b) and its 
alternatives also carry the risk of successive appeals, because appellate 
courts may be required to review non-adjudicated claims later decided by 
the district court. 
Third, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41 acts as a built in 
barrier to the risk of successive appeals.  That rule provides that voluntary 
                                                                                                                                     
   121 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 20 (Cox, J, concurring).  Judge Cox clarified that: 
Ryan ignores the legitimate reasons that a litigant may opt for a voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice over further proceedings or a dismissal with 
prejudice. Most obviously, the demise of some claims may have “orphaned” 
the rest. For example, the remaining claim may share an element with the 
resolved claims; a conclusion that no evidence exists to support the common 
element may sound the tocsin on the remaining claim. Or perhaps the 
remaining claim was a setoff or a “defensive counterclaim,” one that the 
defendant would not have bothered to bring had the plaintiff not picked a 
fight. Or maybe the claim (like some RICO claims) was not a winner on the 
merits, but offered other tactical advantages (such as wide-ranging discovery 
or a chance to blacken the opponent). 
Id. (Cox, J. concurring). 
See also Barry L. Pickens & Loyd Gattis, The Finality Trap Revisited, SPENCER FANE 
(March 23, 2010), http://www.spencerfane.com/The-Finality-Trap-Revisited-03-23-2010/ 
(recognizing the tough decision about handling supplementary claims upon an adverse 
partial judgment and the finality trap). 
 122 Cf. supra note 120. 
 123 Cf. supra note 120. 
 124 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 20 (Cox, J, concurring) (“Even if the litigant obtains an 
appeal, the Rule 54(b) route comes at a cost to finality.  That is because, notwithstanding 
even an affirmance on appeal, the case is still pending below.”). 
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dismissals of claims without prejudice and without court approval on more 
than occasion, results in an adjudication on the merits.  This means that 
even in a Per Se jurisdiction, a party that unilaterally dismisses non-
adjudicated claims on more than one occasion will be barred from 
obtaining appellate review for those non-adjudicated claims.125  In light of 
this fact, the risk of successive appeals stemming from manufactured 
finality is overstated. 
Overall, appellate review of judgments manufactured for finality 
involve less vertical piecemeal litigation than judgments approved for 
Rule 54(b) review.  This is because Rule 54(b) is really a codified approval 
of simultaneous district and appellate court litigation, and because 
judgments manufactured for finality carry the risks that non adjudicated 
claims will be lost due to the expiration of the statute of limitations or the 
denial of appellate jurisdiction due to manipulation.126 
4.  District Courts 
The Supreme Court has observed: 
[The final judgment rule] emphasizes the deference that appellate 
courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon 
to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the 
course of a trial.  Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine 
                                                                                                                                     
 125 Fed. R. Civ. P 41.  Section (a)(1)(B) of the rule states that for voluntary dismissals 
without prejudice and without court approval, a second voluntary dismissal acts as an 
adjudication on the merits: 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal. 
(1) By the Plaintiff. 
(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and 
any applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a 
court order by filing: 
(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or 
a motion for summary judgment; or 
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. 
(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is 
without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or 
state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal 
operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
(2) By Court Order; Effect. Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action 
may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that 
the court considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before 
being served with the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action may be 
dismissed over the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can remain 
pending for independent adjudication. Unless the order states otherwise, a 
dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice. 
Id. 
 126 See generally supra notes 72–73. 
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the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role 
that individual plays in our judicial system.127 
a.  Ryan Rule and District Court Authority 
One of the strongest rationales for the Ryan rule is preserving district 
court authority and integrity.128  This is because the rule prevents parties 
from dismissing non-adjudicated claims without prejudice and later re-
filing them in a different district court.129  As seen in the section above, 
this concern is grounded in much more than theory.130 
b.  Per Se and Discretionary Standard Rules and District Court 
Authority 
 
Nonetheless, re-filing concerns may be overstated. As an initial 
matter, the Discretionary Standard includes re-filing of dismissed claims 
as a factor showing manipulation.131  As seen in Fletcher, circuits using a 
Discretionary Standard can deny jurisdiction if there is a re-filing concern, 
unlike circuits applying a Per Se rule, as in Couer D’Alene, where the 
circuit court accepted appellate jurisdiction over a partial adjudication, 
despite the plaintiff’s decision to re-file non-adjudicated claims dismissed 
without prejudice in state court.132 
Setting aside re-filing concerns where non-adjudicated claims are 
dismissed without district court approval, when dismissals of remaining 
claims are made with a district court’s approval, manufactured finality can 
provide a valuable and desirable added option to the district court’s for 
when they choose to bless a judgment for appellate review.  For example, 
and ironically, in Ryan, the district court in that case certified a judgment 
for Rule 54(b) review, reversed its approval, and permitted the parties to 
manufacture finality.133 This option also comes with added docket clearing 
                                                                                                                                     
 127 Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999) (citing Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981)). 
 128 State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Our 
precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here ‘would undermine the 
policies of judicial efficency, avoiding piecemeal litigation, and district court independence 
that are the basis of the final judgment rule.’”). 
 129 See supra notes 98–115; see also Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 12. 
 130 See supra notes 98–115. 
 131 See generally Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (1979). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978) cited in Cook 
v. Rocky Mountain, 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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benefits since the dismissed claims may never return – unlike Rule 54(b) 
appeals where non-adjudicated claims remain with the district court.134 
There is also reason to believe this added option, when exercised 
with district court approval, will boost district court authority in 
comparison to Rule 54(b).  This is because, satisfying Rule 54(b)’s two-
part requirement has been confusing and difficult for district courts to 
apply, leading to situations where appellate review has been denied despite 
a district court’s certification.135 
5.  The Appellate Courts 
a.  The Ryan & Per Se Rules & Appellate Courts 
Although the Ryan and Per Se rules are opposites in that one rejects 
and the other accepts manufactured finality, they share the common trait 
of uniformity and low procedural review costs.136  In contrast to the 
Discretionary Standard which requires appellate courts to comb the record 
for manipulative intent, both the Ryan and Per Se rules either uniformly 
deny or grant parties the right to manufacture appellate review of a final 
judgment.137 
One area where the rules, of course, end up differing, however, are 
their respective effects on appellate court dockets.  The Per Se approach 
will likely increase them, while the Ryan rule will likely control them and 
keep them steady.138 
b.  The Discretionary Standard Rule & Appellate Courts 
As the approach which places the greatest amount of added 
responsibility on the appellate courts, the discretionary rule comes with 
procedural review costs and increased appellate court involvement in cases 
                                                                                                                                     
 134 Cf. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 20 (Cox, J, concurring) (“Even if the litigant obtains an 
appeal, the Rule 54(b) route comes at a cost to finality.  That is because, notwithstanding 
even an affirmance on appeal, the case is still pending below.”). 
 135 E.g., Taco John’s of Huron, Inc. v. Bix Produce Co. 569 F.3d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 
2009); Ebrahimi c. City of Huntsville Bd. Of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 167 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Nichols v. Cadle Co., 101 F.3d 1448, 1449 (1st Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Bassett (In re Sc. 
Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1550 (11th Cir. 1995); Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1444 (7th Cir. 1988); Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts College 843 
F.2d 38, 44–46 (1st Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986).  These 
cases are cited in Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(B): Seventy-Five And Ready For 
Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711, 714–51 n. 275 (2013). 
 136 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 21. 
 137 Id. 
 138 This is because one virtually always denies and the other virtually always grants 
jurisdiction. 
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before the traditional notion of a final judgment.139  This is because 
appellate courts will grant jurisdiction in some but not all cases, and be 
required to comb the district court record for evidence of intent to 
manipulate appellate jurisdiction.140  Exactly what evidence? To date, 
there has never been a comprehensive and exhaustive list of criteria laid 
out, but throughout the case law appellate judges have identified several 
factors in their opinions which have been considered before accepting or 
denying appellate jurisdiction.  The factors include but are not limited to 
whether: (1) the non-adjudicated claims are dismissals with or without 
courtapproval;141 (2) the non-adjudicated claims are subject to the statute 
of limitations clock or whether there is an agreement to permit revival of 
the dismissed claims regardless of statute of limitations concerns;142 (3) 
the losing or prevailing party has dismissed the non-adjudicated claims;143 
(4) parties have engaged in dilatory tactics, such as prodding the district 
court to dismiss non-adjudicated claims without prejudice for failure to 
prosecute;144 (5) the non-adjudicated claims have been re-filed and if 
horizontal piecemeal litigation concerns are present;145 (6) non-
adjudicated claims are dismissed in multiple steps or through 
amendments;146 (7) non-adjudicated claims dismissed without prejudice 
are closely related to the partial adjudication or the number of parties and 
complexity of litigation would invite piecemeal appellate review.147 
                                                                                                                                     
 139 See generally Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 21 (“The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ practice of 
combing the record for evidence of manipulative intent and the Third Circuit’s 
analysis . . . waste resources better spent on the merits of appeals.  Jurisdiction is a threshold 
matter.”). 
 140 Id.; see also supra note 51. 
 141 See supra notes 72–73. 
 142 See supra notes 72–73; see also infra note 185. 
 143 See Section II(B)(6)(b) infra notes 163–186 (describing case law where courts 
considered or made a note about whether a prevailing or losing party dismissed claims 
without prejudice and sought to appeal). 
 144 See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 
1234 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 145 See Section II(B)(3)(a) supra notes 106-115 (describing situations where parties 
manufacture finality, refile claims dismissed without prejudice in a different district court, 
and simultaneously appeal any adverse rulings). 
 146 See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 147 See id.  The Supreme Court has also held closely related claims with overlapping 
factual allegations in complex litigation can still be successful candidates for Rule 54(b), 
although the relatedness of the claims can still be a factor weighing against the exercise of 
Rule 54(b) review.  See Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering Foundry Co., 351 
U.S. 445, 451 n.6 (1956) (“Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1939, it may well have been true that the Court of Appeals would not, at this 
stage, have had jurisdiction over United’s appeal. Under the single judicial unit theory of 
finality which was then recognized, the Court of Appeals would have been without 
jurisdiction until United’s counterclaim also had been decided by the District Court. That 
2014] Increase Access to the Appellate Courts 73 
In the majority of cases, answering these questions will not be any 
more difficult and likely much easier than completing the two-part 
“separateness” and “no just reason for delay” analysis required for Rule 
54(b) appeals.148  This means that in comparison to the Ryan rule, the 
discretionary approach comes with significant benefits in terms of clarity, 
deference to the district courts, and fairness to the parties, despite minimal 
procedural review costs.149 
6.  The Parties 
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham has remarked: 
[T]he proper allocation of federal jurisdiction is of profound 
importance to federal judges, but it is of even more importance to 
the future welfare of American citizens.  How we deal with [the] 
issues of . . . jurisdiction of federal courts has more to do with our 
values, our appraisal, and our vision of America than it does with 
any subtle issue[s] of . . . jurisdiction . . . . [I]f judicial reform 
benefits only judges, then it isn’t worth pursuing.  If it holds out 
progress only for the legal profession, then it isn’t worth 
pursuing . . . .  It is worth pursuing only if it helps to secure those 
constitutional and statutory rights which, because they should be 
enjoyed by all of our citizens, have made our democracy, despite 
its faults and failures, a significant model for the world.150 
a.  Parties and the Ryan Rule 
As discussed above, the Ryan rule comes with certain piecemeal 
litigation, district court, and appellate court resource benefits.151  
Nonetheless, these advantages may come at an extreme cost to parties in 
litigation.  This is because the Ryan rule requires a choice between two 
extremes: incurring significant and potentially unnecessary costs to litigate 
peripheral claims to final adjudication in order to keep them, or dismissing 
them with prejudice and losing them forever to obtain early appellate 
                                                                                                                                     
would have been so even if the counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction and 
occurrence as Cold Metal’s claim.”). 
 148 See supra note 87. 
 149 See supra note 87. 
 150 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction: The Essential Guarantor of 
Human Rights, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 57, 
61(C. Harrison & R. Wheeler, eds., 1989). 
 151 See Sections II(B)(3-5)(describing the Ryan rule’s piecemeal litigation advantages, 
disctrict court authority advantages, and appellate court preservation of resource 
advantages); see also supra notes 92–120, 132–34. 
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review.152  If parties are unaware of the rule against manufactured finality 
in Ryan jurisdictions, there is the potential for overly harsh outcomes and 
unknowingly falling into a “finality trap.”153  In other cases, where a party 
is familiar with the Ryan rule, but their opponent is not, there is the 
potential for “pushing” an opponent into a “finality trap” after prevailing 
in a partial adjudication.154 
b.  Litigation Limbo & the Finality Trap 
Imagine a party has brought a three count action in a circuit following 
the Ryan rule.  The district court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the first, most significant and major claim, but leaves the two other more 
minor and peripheral claims untouched.  After conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis, the plaintiff determines the minor and peripheral claims aren’t 
worth pursuing independently, but are still valuable for their “bolstering” 
and supplementary effect on the major claim. In light of this relatively 
reasonable analysis, the plaintiff dismisses its remaining claims without 
prejudice and appeals. 
This seemingly innocent mistake can have harsh and drastic 
consequences.  After dismissing the non-adjudicated claims without 
prejudice, and as a matter of right, the action is no longer on the district or 
appellate court dockets.155  The case is no longer on the district court’s 
docket, because all the claims have been adjudicated or dismissed.156  
Similarly, the case will never reach an appellate court’s docket since in 
                                                                                                                                     
 152 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 15(11th Cir. 1999) 
(encouraging parties to make tough choices about dismissing claims with prejudice or 
litigating them to finality). Id. at 20 (Cox, J., concurring) (discussing the need to litigate 
claims to finality or lose them forever in Ryan jurisdictions). 
 153 See infra note 155. 
 154 See infra notes 177–87 (discussing the concept of a prevailing party that has the only 
remaining claims left in a suit dismissing their remaining claims without prejudice in order 
to block their opponents from appealing). 
 155 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 19 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(“Once the district court has relinquished jurisdiction, the litigant has no sure way of 
obtaining finality that would permit review of the district court’s order in this action.  If 
the litigant begins a new action with the voluntarily dismissed claims, and that second 
action proceeds to judgment, the litigant of course cannot raise issues from the first action 
on appeal in the second action.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moreover, do not 
provide any explicit mechanism for “undismissing,” after judgment, any voluntarily 
dismissed claims so that the litigant could ultimately appeal.”); see also  Marshall v. Kan. 
City Southern Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2004) (where plaintiff dismissed 
remaining claims without prejudice and the appellate court denied jurisdiction); Pickens 
and Gattis, supra note 121 (acknowledging that after dismissals without prejudice and a 
denial of appellate jurisdiction the finality trap is sprung and the case is no longer pending 
in any court). 
 156 See supra note 155. 
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Ryan jurisdictions there is no appealable final judgment.157  The partial 
judgment is stuck in a finality trap – litigation limbo.158 
This problem is not uncommon since the issue of manufactured 
finality and the rules governing the issue are not widely known by 
practitioners.159  Nonetheless, some appellate courts have given parties an 
“out” and the option to dismiss remaining claims with prejudice at oral 
argument in order to create appellate jurisdiction.160 
c.  Prevailing Parties and the Finality Trap 
In the hypothetical above, only the losing party dismissed non-
adjudicated claims without prejudice.  Nonetheless, Ryan rule jurisdictions 
have held true to the idea that all remaining claims must be dismissed with 
prejudice or litigated to finality in order to produce a final appealable 
judgment.161  This is true even if the prevailing party is the party left with 
non-adjudicated claims, and the “losing party” has no control over whether 
the prevailing party chooses to dismiss its non-adjudicated claims with or 
without prejudice.162 
For example, in State Treasurer of Michigan v. Barry all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims were adjudicated or dismissed with prejudice.163  The 
only non-adjudicated claims in the case were from the defendant’s 
counterclaim.164  By agreement, the parties stipulated that the defendant 
could dismiss its non-adjudicated counterclaims without prejudice in order 
to facilitate appellate review of the adjudicated claims and avoid 
                                                                                                                                     
 157 See supra note 155. 
 158 See supra note 155. 
 159 See generally Pickens and Gattis supra note 121. 
 160 See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary Dist., 629 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“So at argument we gave Arrow’s lawyer the following choice: stand your ground 
and we’ll dismiss the appeal, or convert your dismissal of the other two defendants to 
dismissal with prejudice, which will bar your refiling your claims against them.  He quickly 
chose the second option, committing not to refile the suit against them, and so, because the 
final judgment in the district court is now definitive, we have jurisdiction of the appeal.”) 
(citing India Breweries, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 612 F.3d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2010)); 
Helcher v. Dearborn County, 595 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 2010); JTC Petroleum Co. v. 
Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 776-77 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Nat’l Inspection & 
Repairs v. George S. May, 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (allowing dismissals with 
prejudice of remaining claims after oral argument resulting in the panel finding 
jurisdiction). 
 161 See State Treasurer of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 162 See e.g. Hood v. Plantation Gen. Med. Ctr, 251 F.3d 932 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(dismissing an appeal by one plantiff because another plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed 
the claim) (cited in Pickens and Gattis, supra note 121 at n.11.)  See generally infra notes 
163–86. 
 163 168 F.3d 8. 
 164 Id. at 9–11. 
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potentially unnecessary litigation of the counterclaim.165  Despite the 
approval of both parties, the appellate court found the losing party’s 
agreement to the dismissal weighed against, not in favor of the exercise of 
jurisdiction.166  A major reason for the ultimate denial of appellate 
jurisdiction was the fear that the parties could undermine the district court 
by manufacturing finality without the court’s approval.167 
Nonetheless, what if the district court approves dismissal of the non-
adjudicated claims to alleviate this concern?168 This is precisely what 
occurred in Heimann v. Snead, but still, it was not enough.169  In that case, 
the Heimanns’ filed a seven count diversity action against bank defendants 
alleging multiple theories of mortgage foreclosure improprieties.170  
Defendants counterclaimed alleging trespass.171  The defendants 
successfully disposed of six of the seven counts in the plaintiff’s 
complaint.172  Soon after, the parties agreed the plaintiffs would dismiss 
their remaining claim with prejudice, while the defendant would dismiss 
its counterclaim without prejudice.173  The parties submitted this 
agreement to the district court and obtained its approval for the 
dismissals.174  The district court expressed its approval and stated that, “the 
matter is now final and immediately appealable.”175  Still, adhering to the 
Ryan rule, appellate jurisdiction was denied, and the circuit court justified 
its ruling based on a concern that manufactured finality undermined Rule 
54(b).176 
                                                                                                                                     
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 13 (“[P]laintiff, argues, it had no control of the manner in which the dismissal 
of the [Defendants’] counterclaim took place, either with or without prejudice.  This 
argument fails, however, because Plaintiff consented to the dismissal without prejudice of 
Defendants’ counterclaims.”) 
 167 Id. (“[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that parties to a suit cannot agree to grant this 
Court appellate jurisdiction.”). 
 168 See Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 169 Id. 
 170 See id.at 768. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Heimann, 133 F.3d at 768. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 769 (“The plain language of Rule 54(b) . . . [controls where] the court disposed 
of “fewer than all claims” on the merits.  Thus Rule 54(b), not § 1291, provides Plaintiffs’ 
with the means for appeal in [that] case.”). 
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d.  Parties and the Discretionary and Per Se Rules 
On the other hand, circuits permitting manufactured finality avoid 
the harsh consequences that the district courts and cooperative parties 
faced in State Treasurer and Heimann.177 
Permitting manufactured finality also prevents prevailing parties 
from being able to strategically dismiss minor non-adjudicated claims in 
order to trap opponents in litigation limbo.178  Unlike State Treasurer and 
Heimann, sometimes a prevailing party will dismiss its non-adjudicated 
claims without prejudice with the intention of stopping an opponent from 
obtaining appellate review.179  Logically, since the goal of a prevailing 
party’s manipulation is to block appellate review, Ryan jurisdictions only 
contribute to this manipulation, because the remedy to this dilatory tactic 
is to grant, not deny the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.180 
For example, in Local Motion v. Niescher, the plaintiff, Local 
Motion, filed suit against a former distributor and licensee based on causes 
of action for breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, and breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.181  Local Motion prevailed on 
a motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract and 
breach of the covenant of good faith claims.182  Shortly after, Local Motion 
dismissed the only remaining non-adjudicated claims without prejudice 
and the defendant then appealed.183 
                                                                                                                                     
 177 This is because appellate courts can grant jurisdiction and rule upon certain 
judgments manufactured for finality.  See generally State Treasurer of State of Michigan 
v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 20 (Cox, J., concurring). 
 178 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 20 (Cox, J., concurring). 
 179 See Pickens and Gattis, supra note 121 at n. 12.  (“In fact, the finality trap may create 
an opportunity for an egregious type of manipulation of the judicial process: If a party 
determines during the course of litigation that it will likely prevail, it might add a claim (or 
counterclaim) solely to dismiss it without prejudice later, and thereby arguably prevent its 
adversary from ever being able to appeal the adverse ruling – in effect, ensuring that its 
anticipated victory is unappealable.”). See generally infra note 175–82. 
 180 See Local Motion v. Niescher, 105 F.3d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1997).  The court 
found: 
Local Motion contends the dismissal of its remaining claims without 
prejudice means there is no final judgment. This court has held that a losing 
party may not “manufacture finality” by dismissing his or her remaining 
claims without prejudice. Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 
1073 (9th Cir.1994). Here, however, the prevailing party has dismissed the 
remaining claims without prejudice in an effort to prevent an appeal. 
Dannenberg and similar cases disapproved a party’s “manipulation” of the 
appellate process. Local Motion is not entitled to use similar manipulation to 
thwart an appeal. The district court’s judgment is appealable. Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
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At the appellate court, Local Motion argued against appellate 
jurisdiction asserting that, “the dismissal of its remaining claims without 
prejudice means there is no final judgment.”184  The Ninth Circuit found 
that a prevailing party’s unilateral dismissal of non-adjudicated claims 
without prejudice, even with court approval, was a manipulative attempt 
to block appellate jurisdiction.185  The court found that although in the 
typical case, a losing party’s manipulation is an attempt to create 
jurisdiction, in cases involving a prevailing party’s manipulation, the 
appropriate remedy is to exercise jurisdiction.186 
Without manufactured finality, on the other hand, the prevailing 
party’s manipulation would successfully block jurisdiction, leaving the 
losing party stuck with an adverse decision and without the ability to 
obtain appellate review– stuck in a finality trap and in litigation limbo.187 
7.  Conditional Finality 
Throughout the case law and academic literature, “conditional 
dismissals,” or dismissals with conditional prejudice, are dismissals of 
non-adjudicated claims where the ultimate “with” or “without prejudice” 
designation depends upon the outcome of an appeal.188  Here both terms 
are used interchangeably. 
The Ryan, Per Se, and Discretionary Standard Rule Jurisdictions, 
the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court: Dismissals With 
Conditional Prejudice 
a.  The Majority 
To date, apart from the Second Circuit, every circuit faced with 
scenarios involving conditional dismissals have rejected the practice.189  
                                                                                                                                     
 184 Id. 
 185 Local Motion, 105 F.3d at 1279. 
 186 Id. 
 187 See generally Section II(B)(6)(b),  supra notes 155–79 (describing situations where 
prevailing parties dismissed remaining claims without prejudice and the losing party was 
denied the right to appeal regardless of whether the district court approved). 
 188 See generally Joseph Struble, An Early Roll of the Dice: Appeal Under Conditional 
Finality in Federal Court, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 221 (2012). 
 189 See Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC,  733 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(rejecting conditional dismissals for undermining the concept of finality, Rule 54(b) and 
Section 1292, contributing to successive appeals, and avoiding statute of limitations risks); 
SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 55–56 (2nd Cir. 2011) (allowing conditional dismissal); India 
Breweries, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 612 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting conditional 
dismissals but exercising jurisdiction after dismissal of remaining claims with prejudice at 
oral argument); National Inspection & Repairs v. George S. May, 600 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 
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Even circuits currently applying a Per Se or Discretionary Standard rule 
have rejected conditional finality.190  This is because historically, 
jurisdictions permitting manufactured finality justified the practice based 
on the fact that non-adjudicated claims dismissed without prejudice were 
subject to the statute of limitations and couldn’t be re-filed indefinitely.191  
Since dismissals with conditional prejudice often times interrupt or stop 
the statute of limitations clock, conditional dismissals have been 
categorically considered manipulative and denied appellate review.192 
b.  The Second Circuit 
Surprisingly, the Second Circuit traditionally a Ryan jurisdiction, 
approved of conditional dismissals in Purdy v. Zeldes.193 In that case, the 
plaintiff, Purdy filed a legal malpractice action against his former criminal 
defense lawyers alleging they were negligent in: (1) failing to learn that 29 
other first-time offenders were charged with the same offense, pled guilty, 
and avoided prison sentences; (2) failing to inform Purdy of statements 
made by the prosecutor; and (3) failing to inform him that cooperation and 
a reduced sentence were still possible at post-sentencing.194 
The attorneys argued that the first two negligence allegations were 
barred by collateral estoppel based on earlier rulings in an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim brought against them during Purdy’s 
                                                                                                                                     
2010) (same); Clos v. Corr. Corp. of Am, 597 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (where the district 
court approved Rule 54(b) certification and denied conditional dismissals, the appellate 
court disapproved of both Rule 54(b) and conditional finality leading the appeal to be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253 (2nd Cir. 2003) (allowing 
conditional dismissal); Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 
431 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting conditional finality, but ultimately exercising jurisdiction 
after remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice) (citing Verzilli v. Flexon, Inc., 295 
F.3d 421 (3d. Cir. 2002) (rejecting conditional finality)); First Health Group v. BCE 
Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2001) (decision cited by many more recent Seventh 
Circuit opinions and other circuits rejecting conditional finality, but one which questions 
and does not ultimately decide whether conditional dismissals properly can be held to 
create a final judgment); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 
1994) (rejecting conditional finality for creating risk of successive appeals, undermining 
Rule 54(b), and not ending the litigation on the merits) (citing Cheng v. Comm’r, 878 F.2d 
306 (9th Cir. 1989) (but in Cheng there was no provision stating that the dismissals would 
be with prejudice if the appellate court affirmed the district court unlike more modern 
conditional dismissals)). 
 190 See supra note 189. 
 191 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999). See 
generally supra note 189. 
 192 See generally supra note 189. 
 193 337 F.3d 253 (2nd Cir. 2003). 
 194 Id. at 257. 
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incarceration.195  The district court agreed collateral estoppel barred the 
first two allegations, but denied defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment as to the third allegation that Purdy’s defense attorneys failed to 
inform him of vital post-sentencing information.196 
Nonetheless Purdy felt the post-sentence allegation was not worth 
pursuing independently, and moved to dismiss the third claim with 
conditional prejudice, that is, Purdy agreed to a “with prejudice” dismissal 
of his the third claim, but only if, the adverse adjudications of his first two 
allegations were upheld on appeal.197  The district court approved of the 
conditional dismissals.198  The Second Circuit similarly approved stating: 
A plaintiff’s attempt to appeal a prior adverse determination 
following the dismissal of his remaining claims without prejudice 
necessarily implicates the policies of the final judgment rule . . . 
[W]hen a plaintiff is completely free to relitigate voluntarily 
dismissed claims, the final judgment rule ordinarily precludes this 
court from reviewing any adverse determination by the district 
court in that case.  However, where, as here, a plaintiff’s ability to 
reassert a claim is made conditional on obtaining a reversal from 
this court, the finality rule is not implicated in the same way.  
Unlike the plaintiff in Chappelle, Purdy runs the risk that if his 
appeal is unsuccessful; his malpractice case comes to an end.  We 
therefore hold that a conditional waiver such as Purdy’s creates a 
final judgment reviewable by this court.199 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, the 
appeal was unsuccessful, and as a result, Purdy’s case ended.200 
Despite the rejection of conditional finality by the majority of 
circuits, there is still historical precedent for dismissing claims with 
attached conditions.  For example, even before the Ryan rule was created, 
in LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that a 
district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s action without prejudice but with 
certain heightened conditions and limitations on the ability to reopen the 
case carried with it the requisite “legal prejudice” to be considered a final 
judgment. 201  Specifically, in LeCompte, the Fifth Circuit recognized that 
a dismissal without prejudice but with the court imposed conditions that: 
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(1) any later suits be re-filed in the same court; (2) a showing of 
extraordinary circumstances be made, and (3) an affirmative 
demonstration of a valid cause of action be presented before the suit could 
be revived was an appealable final judgment. 202 The Seventh Circuit has 
more recently recognized a dismissal with certain conditions may lead to 
the “legal prejudice” necessary for an appeal, leaving open the possibility 
that other circuits may later adopt a similar view.203 
c.  The Supreme Court, Conditional Dismissals, and Manufactured 
Finality: SEC v. Gabelli 
More recently, the Supreme Court decided a case involving claims 
dismissed with conditional prejudice, although the opinion centered on a 
securities law tolling issue, and declined to the address the issue of 
manufactured finality.204  In Gabelli, the SEC brought a three count 
                                                                                                                                     
 202 See id. at 602. 
 203 Palka v. Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 438 n.4 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[i]f the district court 
imposes conditions on the voluntary dismissal, and if those conditions amount to ‘legal 
prejudice,’ the plaintiff then may have grounds for appeal.”) (citing Parker v. Freightliner 
Corp., 940 F.2d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 204 Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).  The Court’s unanimous decision rejects the 
discovery rule in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on SEC claims 
based on the Investment Advisers Act for civil penalties.  See Jonathan Macey, Opinion 
analysis: That Which Does Not Kill the SEC May Make the Agency Stronger, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Feb. 28, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/opinion-analysis-that-
which-does-not-kill-the-sec-may-make-the-agency-stronger/ (pointing out the decision on 
balance favors the SEC because if the statute of limitations ran according to when the SEC 
could have reasonably discovered fraud that it might be compelled to refute arguments in 
virtually every case that, had it been reasonably diligent, the SEC would have known of 
the fraud much earlier and therefore is time barred from bringing the case); Rachel 
McKenzie &Robert Cohen, Supreme Court Unanimously Limits SEC’s Ability to Bring 
Civil Penalty Claims to Conduct Older than Five Years, ORRICK – SECURITIES LITIGATION 
AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Feb. 27, 2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/securities-
litigation/2013/02/27/supreme-court-unanimously-limits-secs-ability-to-bring-civil-
penalty-claims-for-conduct-older-than-five-years/#more-326 (evaluating the application 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 and explaining the Supreme Court’s decision as being significant for 
three reasons: (1) Section 2462 applies to district court and agency enforcement 
proceedings; (2) its potential application to equitable tolling arguments involving Section 
2462; (3) its potential application to injunctive relief and the Supreme Court’s SEC v. 
Bartek, et. al. decision.); Christopher M. Mason, et al., Gabelli v. SEC, NIXON PEABODY: 
SECURITIES LITIGATION ALERT (March 1, 2013), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/
Gabelli_v_SEC/ (claiming the Gabelli decision represents a victory for the defense bar, but 
cautioning that even if penalties are subject to a five year limitations period that other 
equitable relief may still be available to the SEC); Stephen A. Fogdall, Gabelli v. SEC: The 
Supreme Court’s Statute of Limitations Rulings Puts Pressure on Federal Agencies to 
Investigate More Aggressively and Sue More Quickly, SCHNADER – FINANCIAL SERVICES 
LITIGATION ALERT (March 2013), http://www.schnader.com/files/ Uploads/Documents/
FSLPG%20Alert_Gabelli%20v%20SEC_03-2013.pdf (highlighting the distinction 
between the SEC and privately aggrieved parties, and emphasizing that the decision may 
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complaint against a mutual fund’s portfolio manager and the CEO of the 
fund’s adviser.205  The SEC sought civil monetary damages, disgorgement, 
and injunctive relief based on violations of the 1933 Securities Act (“‘33 
Act”), the 1934 Securities & Exchange Act (“34 Act”), and the Investment 
Advisors Act (“IAA” or “Advisors Act”).206 
The district court dismissed the first two counts of the complaint 
seeking injunctive relief, and also dismissed a portion of the third count 
seeking civil penalties under the Investment Advisers Act.207  Only the 
SEC’s claim for disgorgement based on the Advisors Act in the third count 
remained.208 
The SEC ultimately felt disgorgement alone was an inadequate 
remedy and moved to voluntarily dismiss that claim with conditional 
prejudice 209  In other words, the SEC agreed it could only re-file the 
disgorgement claim “if but only if, the SEC [was] successful” on appeal.210  
The district court granted the SEC’s motion to conditionally dismiss the 
disgorgement claim over the defendant’s objections.211  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the validity of the conditional dismissal, finding there was 
a final judgment, since, unlike a traditional dismissal without prejudice 
and nothing more, a party replaces the risk posed by the expiration of the 
statute of limitations with the risk that claims will be lost forever if their 
appeal is unsuccessful.212  Upon exercising appellate jurisdiction, the 
Second Circuit reversed all of the district court’s dismissals, and reinstated 
the ‘33,’34 and Advisors Act causes of action, including all claims for 
injunctive relief and civil penalties.213 
Gabelli appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
the limited question of whether the statute of limitations barred the SEC 
from recovering civil penalties through the Advisors Act.214  Ultimately, 
on this issue, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                                     
put more pressure on the SEC to use its investigative parties more frequently and earlier in 
order to assume a litigation posture more promptly and minimize the risk of a limitations 
bar); Walter Olson, Gabelli v. SEC: Fairness Wins, 9–0, CATO AT LIBERTY (February 28, 
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 205 SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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 214 Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013). 
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and found the “discovery rule” did not apply to SEC actions based on the 
Advisors Act, that the statute of limitations had expired, and the SEC could 
no longer recover  civil penalties.215 
The Court’s decision to grant certiorari but failure to specifically 
address the issues of conditional dismissals and manufactured finality may 
be for a variety of reasons.  On the one hand, it could be that the Court 
simply overlooked the issue or found it lacked enough importance for its 
resolution in that term.  On the other hand, the Court may have felt it was 
an inopportune time to address them for any number of reasons (docket 
management, lack of urgency, a desire to allow the doctrine to develop 
among the circuits before intervening, implicit approval of manufactured 
finality, or other reasons).  Regardless, one thing is certain, the Court, 
unlike many of the circuits, has not yet decided that appellate jurisdiction 
is categorically improper in the presence of a conditional dismissal or a 
judgment manufactured for finality. 
 
III.  LIMITED ACCEPTANCE OF MANUFACTURED FINALITY 
In this section, Part A argues that a gradual shift towards limited 
acceptance of manufactured is largely inevitable and already underway.  
Part B argues limited acceptance of manufactured finality and the 
Discretionary Standard is the most advantageous approach because of its 
net fairness, efficiency, and piecemeal litigation benefits, despite appellate 
resource and uniformity cost disadvantages.  Part C argues that despite the 
disadvantages discussed, the Supreme Court should act to harmonize the 
transition towards limited acceptance of manufactured finality by: (1) 
adopting a discretionary approach and providing enumerated criteria for 
appellate courts to consider when deciding whether to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction and (2) explicitly permitting the dismissal of remaining claims 
with conditional prejudice in order to minimize the expenditure of 
appellate resources and maximize uniformity in the transition to 
acceptance of limited manufactured finality. 
A. A Shift Towards Limited Acceptance of Manufactured Finality 
Up until this point, the article has treated the three approaches to 
manufactured finality as entirely distinct and separate.  Nonetheless in 
practice, through the creation of exceptions and intra-circuit divides, some 
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of the circuits are converging towards limited acceptance of manufactured 
finality, albeit at different paces and in different manners.216 
On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit, usually a follower of the Per Se 
rule, recently applied a discretionary approach by finding appellate 
jurisdiction existed after determining there was an absence of 
manipulation.217 
On the other hand, some of the Ryan circuits have created exceptions 
to strict finality and moved closer to a de facto Discretionary Standard.218  
For example, in the Fifth Circuit, a district court’s dismissal of claims 
without prejudice for improper joinder did not prevent the plaintiff from 
seeking appellate review.219  Similarly, in the Eleventh Circuit, a party’s 
dismissal of claims without prejudice did not prevent appellate jurisdiction 
where an appellate panel ruled the district court improperly denied the 
joinder of an indispensable party.220 
The transition is also found in the Second Circuit’s acceptance of 
conditional finality.221  For example, absent alternative appellate doctrines, 
Ryan jurisdictions refuse to consider a judgment final, unless remaining 
claims have been dismissed with prejudice or the claims have been fully 
adjudicated on the merits .222  Nonetheless, as acknowledged in LeCompte 
v. Mr. Chip, Inc., Ryan jurisdictions may eventually expand their views to 
embrace conditional finality, since “legal prejudice” does not necessarily 
require non-adjudicated claims to be dismissed with prejudice.223 
At the same time, circuits that have historically applied a pragmatic 
view towards finality have carefully placed boundaries and limitations on 
their doctrines.  For example, the Sixth Circuit and Eighth Circuit, 
traditionally Per Se jurisdictions, have recently found that conditional 
                                                                                                                                     
 216 See generally notes 44, 48, and 51 and accompanying text.  These notes cite to Ryan, 
Per Se, and Discretionary Standard rule cases throughout the circuits.  Although many 
appellate panels expressly endorse a single rule, some circuits have different lines of cases 
for different rules, while others adopt characteristics or rulings from competing rules in 
practice. 
 217 Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2012) (“In short, the 
circumstances here are inconsistent with a conclusion that Gannon sought to manipulate 
our appellate jurisdiction.  So, we turn to the merits of the appeal.”). 
 218 See Brown Shoes Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962); Gannon Int’l, Ltd., 
684 F.3d 785; Equity Inv. Partners, Lp. v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 219 See Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 220 See Equity Inv. Partners, Lp v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 221 See  generally Section II(B)(7)(b), supra notes 193–215 (describing the Second 
Circuit’s adoption of conditional finality despite being a traditional Ryan rule jurisdiction). 
 222 See generally note 44. 
 223 See Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 438 n.4 (7th Cir. 2011); LeCompte v. 
Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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dismissals were categorically inappropriate and denied the exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction. 224 
B. In Advocacy of Acceptance of Limited Manufactured Finality and the 
Discretionary Standard 
Consideration of the seven criteria support the idea that the shift 
towards limited acceptance of manufactured finality is more than just a 
coincidence.  Specifically, as Ryan jurisdictions face finality trap issues, 
and Per Se jurisdictions face piecemeal litigation concerns, exceptions and 
the need for movement towards a more moderate approach will become 
apparent.  Admittedly, the limited acceptance of manufactured finality and 
the Discretionary Standard isn’t without its own associated costs.225  
Nonetheless, between the three approaches it is the most advantageous 
approach in terms of its fairness, efficiency, and piecemeal litigation 
benefits versus its uniformity and appellate resource costs.226 
Below is a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of an 
adoption of the discretionary approach in light of the background section, 
fairness, efficiency, piecemeal litigation, uniformity, and appellate 
resources considerations. 
1.  Advantages 
a.  Fairness & Efficiency 
Limited acceptance of manufactured finality balances the heightened 
fact pleading standard requirements marked by Iqbal and Twombly.227  As 
plaintiffs are required to plead more fully developed factual accounts of 
their causes of action, the ability of parties to appeal partial judgments to 
obtain clarity on the application of legal authority makes sense in a world 
where pre-trial rulings can determine the terms of settlement.228  In terms 
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 225 See generally Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 21 (“The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ practice of 
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 227 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
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of resources costs, the Discretionary Standard is also advantageous, since, 
unlike the past, the resource burden of appeals are significantly less 
burdensome than from large-scale discovery and trial proceedings.229 
As noted in the introduction and background sections, the majority 
of high-stakes and complex cases are settled after pre-trial motions and 
discovery refine bargaining positions.230  Because parties are less likely to 
proceed to trial in modern litigation, preventing parties from being able to 
manufacture finality, even in cases where the parties intentions are 
innocuous, creates situations where party’s are forced to sacrifice viable 
and important supplementary claims, critical for bargaining leverage and 
resolving litigation without any appellate oversight or involvement. 231  In 
other words, without manufactured finality, trial courts are unintentionally 
left with the unexpected responsibility of having the last word on both fact 
and legal issues, rather than on fact issues alone.232 
For this reason, the option to manufacture finality complements 
rather than undermines Rule 54(b).233  Rule 54(b) still presents the only 
option for parties to obtain early appellate review, while remaining claims 
continue to be litigated at the district court.234  There is reason to believe 
district courts will embrace the increased flexibility of manufactured 
finality as a complement to Rule 54(b).235  As noted above, in Ryan v. 
Occidental Petroleum, the trial court in that case granted Rule 54(b), 
reversed its ruling, and then permitted the parties to manufacture 
finality.236  Furthermore, the additional appellate oversight provided by a 
discretionary standard, especially in areas of law where vanishing trials 
                                                                                                                                     
 229 See Carrington supra note 15.  Professor Carrington is troubled by the lack of access 
to appellate review in several respects.  First appellate rulings are key to uniformity, 
fairness, and equality.  In addition, appellate insight into complex legal issues facilitates 
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 230 See supra notes 3–12. 
 231 See supra notes 82–83. 
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 233 Cf. State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) 
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 236 See generally Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum, 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.). 
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and settlement are especially common, will likely be a much welcomed 
addition by district court judges and parties, since district courts may not 
necessarily wish to exercise the responsibility of administering justice in 
solitude.237 
Unlike Ryan, the discretionary standard avoids the grave injustice of 
the finality trap.238  For many trial attorneys, the issue of manufactured 
finality is an unfamiliar one.  As a result, it is not uncommon for parties to 
manufacture finality unwittingly, and then be denied appellate 
jurisdiction.239  Although some appellate panels have permitted parties to 
dismiss their remaining claims with prejudice at oral argument, this ad hoc 
solution is not a sustainable, workable, and long-term comprehensive 
solution, in light of its inability to prevent prevailing parties from blocking 
appellate jurisdiction.240 
                                                                                                                                     
 237 See Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts: 
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Id. at 78.  Professor Carrington also believes that Roscoe Pound would advance a theory 
of appellate court involvement in deciding legal issues, even before trial, and that this 
involvement would facilitate more and better settlements.  Id. at 80-82. 
 238 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 20 (Cox, J., concurring) (noting the Ryan jurisdictions 
rejection of manufactured finality leads parties into a finality trap where claims are no 
longer on trial or appellate court dockets); see also Local Motion v. Niescher, 105 F.3d 
1278 (9th Cir. 1997) (in contrast to Ryan jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit exercised 
jurisdiction where a prevailing party attempted to manipulate the appellate panel into 
blocking appellate review of the losing party’s adverse judgment). 
 239 See Pickens and Gattis, supra note 121. 
 240 See supra note 160. 
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b.  Piecemeal Litigation 
As the most fundamental and historic concern underlying the final 
judgment rule, any proposed solution to manufactured finality must 
address piecemeal litigation concerns.241 Admittedly, re-filing and 
successive appeals scenarios are rare, but nonetheless enormously costly 
and detrimental to the administration of justice by the federal and state 
judiciaries. 
In light of Coeur D’Alene, the Per Se rule’s re-filing risks and 
potential for creating horizontal and vertical piecemeal litigation is too 
great.242  Permitting the possibility of dismissed claims to be re-filed or for 
successive appeals to be made without limit fails to acknowledge 
fundamental concerns underlying the final judgment rule.243 
On the other hand, “regulated” access to the appellate courts through 
a discretionary standard and denial of jurisdiction to parties that have re-
filed their dismiss claims or are likely to file successive appeals is a long-
term, comprehensive, and workable solution.  Similarly, parties that 
conditionally dismiss their claims avoid horizontal and piecemeal 
litigation concerns since a party’s claims are only revived if successful on 
appeal. 
2. Disadvantages 
The discretionary standard approach carries with it uniformity and 
procedural review costs which its alternatives do not.  These are briefly 
discussed below.244  Part C of this section also addresses means to 
minimize these disadvantages. 
a.  Uniformity & Appellate Resources 
In comparison to the Ryan and Per Se rules, the Discretionary 
Standard carries with it uniformity and appellate review resource costs that 
the others approaches do not.245  The primary concern will be whether 
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scenarios involving similar material facts would be granted appellate 
jurisdiction in some cases, but denied in others.246  Similarly, if appellate 
dockets are overloaded, it is possible some of the circuits may believe their 
resources would be better spent on substantive issues rather than on the 
issues surrounding manufactured finality.247 
Nonetheless, although these concerns are valid, the Supreme Court 
can and should act to minimize the uniformity and appellate resource costs 
by enumerating or codifying as many factors as it can to guide the federal 
appellate courts when deciding whether to grant jurisdiction.  In large part, 
many of the factors have already been identified by the appellate courts 
and the only thing lacking is Supreme Court attention, interest, guidance 
and action on the issue.248 
C. The Supreme Court Should Harmonize the Move Toward Limited 
Acceptance of Manufactured Finality by Adopting the Framework of a 
Discretionary Standard Permitting Conditional Finality 
There are important and related consequences of indeterminacy in 
our law.  It affects the conduct of lawyers in both litigation and 
settlement; and it reallocates power within the judiciary, making 
appellate courts less effective and conferring increased discretion 
on individual district judges. 
With respect to lawyers, increasing indeterminacy of federal law 
weakens the constraints of professionalism that operate on lawyers 
as they draft and file pleadings, motions, and discovery requests to 
be filed in federal courts.  The willingness of lawyers to make 
contentions resting on legal premises of doubtful merit is 
increased.  Lawyers are more likely to “press the inside of the 
envelope” of legal entitlements to the bursting point, thus 
imposing unjust costs on adversaries as well as courts and 
themselves.249 
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Uniformity is critical to provide the clarity the courts, lawyers, and 
the citizenry need to understand their rights in federal court.250  In Gabelli, 
the Supreme Court declined to provide guidance or issue an opinion on the 
portion of the case involving manufactured finality.251  At best, the non-
clarification could be construed as an implicit approval of the practice 
since the Court is under an on-going obligation to address all jurisdictional 
questions regardless of whether the parties raise them in their briefs.252  On 
the other hand, there is case law where the Supreme Court has declined to 
address a virtually identical jurisdictional issue in one case, later 
acknowledged it another – only to ultimately find in the later case that 
jurisdiction was likely inappropriate for both.253 
Irrespective of Gabelli, the Court should endorse a discretionary 
standard and permit parties to dismiss claims with conditional prejudice 
through its rulemaking authority or stare decisis.254  Specifically, the Court 
should identify factors weighing in favor and against the exercise of 
jurisdiction with the recognition that none are entirely dispositive. 
 
Factors weighing in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
where: 
(1) dismissals are with court approval;255 
(2) dismissals are with party approval;256 
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 251 Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013). 
 252 Cf. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 882–83 (1988) (noting implicit approval 
of jurisdictional issue by granting jurisdiction and deciding the merits in Connecticut Dept. 
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 255 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (dismissal is with court approval); see also supra notes 
72–73. 
 256 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (dismissal as a matter of right and without party 
approval where the opposing party has not yet filed an answer or motion for summary 
judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B) (dismissal is with opposing party’s approval).  In 
both these types of dismissals, the court is not required to approve of the dismissals. 
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(3) there is a reasonable risk that dismissed claims will be lost 
either due to the expiration of the statute of limitations or because 
there is an agreement between the parties that the dismissed claims 
may only be revived in the same district court if the appellate court 
reverses in whole or in part; 257 
(4) the prevailing party has dismissed their remaining claims and 
it appears the dismissals are designed to prevent the exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction.258 
 
Factors weighing against the exercise of appellate jurisdiction 
would be where: 
(1) parties have engaged in dilatory tactics, including but not 
limited to prodding the district court to dismiss remaining claims 
without prejudice for failure to prosecute;259 
(2) dismissed claims have been re-filed and the presence of 
horizontal piecemeal litigation concerns;260 
(3) claims are dismissed in multiple steps or through 
amendments261 
(4) claims being dismissed closely relate to the claims being 
appealed and the number of parties and complexity of litigation 
would invite piecemeal appellate review.262 
 
The enumerated criteria for courts to consider would be virtually 
identical to those already present in the case law, with the modification 
that dismissals with conditional prejudice would no longer categorically 
weigh against the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  This type of rule 
would acknowledge that what matters most is whether there is some 
recognizable risk to refiling, regardless of whether that risk comes from 
the expiration of the statute of limitations or the likelihood that an 
appellate court will affirm a district court’s ruling on appeal.263 
                                                                                                                                     
 257 See supra notes 72–73, 185. 
 258 See Section II(B)(6)(b), supra notes 163–86 (describing cases where prevailing 
parties dismissed remaining claims without prejudice to create appellate jurisdiction, and 
Local Motion where the prevailing party dismissed its remaining claims with the intent of 
blocking appellate jurisdiction). 
 259 See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 
1234 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 260 See Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 261 See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 262 See id. 
 263 Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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Although agreements dismissing claims with conditional prejudice 
often times remove the statute of limitations risk traditionally applied to 
dismissed claims– the removal of that risk is not the end of the analysis.  
Put in another way, although parties avoid the risk that dismissed claims 
will be lost due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, parties instead 
run the risk that dismissed claims will be lost if the appellate court affirms 
the district court’s rulings .  In the event the appellate court reverses, unlike 
other judgments manufactured for finality, dismissed claims are revived 
and heard by the same district court where they were first dismissed. This 
prevents a new district court from having to familiarize itself with the facts 
of the case, saves resources avoids horizontal piecemeal litigation, and 
promotes district court authority.264 
Assuming that eighty percent of federal district court judgments are 
affirmed on appeal, conditional finality is also efficient, because in most 
cases, the remaining claims will be dismissed with prejudice. 265  As a 
result, a party’s willingness to tie their ability to revive their claims to a 
twenty percent chance that the appellate court will reverse the district court 
is a risk of losing those claims that is likely much greater than from the 
expiration of the statute of limitations.  With time, parties should discover 
that taking the risks associated with conditional finality is only rational if 
there is a high degree of confidence that the district court made a blatant 
error in its adjudication. 
This type of rule is also fairer regardless of whether the appellate 
courts affirms or reverses on appeal.  In cases where a party is right, the 
district court has made an error, and the appellate court reverses, the 
parties will not have been “forced” to dismiss their remaining claims with 
prejudice and lose them forever on account of an oversight.  On the other 
hand, in cases where the party is wrong, there is no district court error, and 
the appellate court affirms, cases will end, but with the added fairness and 
understanding that the decision to seek early appellate review was taken 
voluntarily, and at the high risk that their remaining claims would be lost. 
                                                                                                                                     
 264 Revival of claims in the same district court prevents a new district court from having 
to learn the facts and circumstances surrounding remaining claims.  Also, it avoids 
undermining the original district court, even if this approach requires a more expansive 
view of finality than traditionally used by even Per Se and Discretionary Standard 
jurisdictions.  See generally supra notes. 55–79 and corresponding text. 
 265 THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
§ 3.01 (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009) (“Pragmatically, the final-decision requirement 
recognizes that most decisions appealed after final judgment – more than four out of five 
– are affirmed, and presumably so would most interlocutory appeals.”); see also Chris 
Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the 
“Affirmance Affect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 
358 (2005) (finding the Supreme Court reverses 64% of the time, but that appellate courts 
affirm 90% of the time) cited in BAKER, supra at 8, § 1.03 n.42. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, a discretionary standard which permits conditional 
finality is designed to reward parties acting in good faith with the desire 
for early appellate review.  By increasing access to the appellate courts in 
an incremental fashion, modernizing the final judgment rule to permit 
limited forms of manufactured finality will adjust federal practice to the 
new cost structures of litigation, while respecting the historic and deeply 
rooted interests underlying the final judgment rule.  Supreme Court action 
and endorsement of discretionary criteria will help smooth the inevitable 
transition to a modernized view of the final judgment rule.  The resulting 
increase in access to the appellate courts will save federal court resources, 
provide a more level playing field for parties, and increase the quality and 
fairness of settlements which define today’s high-stakes, complex, and 
international litigation playing field. 
 
